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Abstract
Unlike most other countries, the United States uses different procedures
to resolve insolvent banks and nonbank firms. The Bankruptcy Code divides
control over nonbank firms among the various claimants, and a judge
supervises the resolution process. By contrast, the FDIC acts as the receiver
for an insolvent bank and has almost complete con trol. Other claimants can
sue the FDIC, but they cannot obtain injunctive relief and their damages are
limited to the amount that they would have received in liquidation. The
FDIC has acted as the receiver of insolvent banks since the Great
Depression, and the concentration of power in the FDIC is traditionally
justified by two arguments: (i) EDI1C control speeds the disposition of the
bank's assets which maintains the liquidity of deposits and encourages faith
in the banking system, and (ii) the FDIC's role as the largest creditor gives it
an incentive to maximize recovery. We ask whether they still (or ever did)
justify FDIC control. The first argument fails because it conflates the need
for a timely satisfaction of the claims of insured depositors by the FDIC with
the need to quickly dispose of the failed bank's assets. As stated, the second
argument fails to justify FDIC control as the largest creditor can take self-
interested actions harmful to other claimants. However, the FDIC is not
merely the largest creditor. A detailed survey of the capital structure Of
failed banks reveals that the FDIC is usually the only major creditor and that
the value of the FDIC's claim nearly always exceeds the value of a failed
bank's assets. The FDIC is the residual claimant and has the incentive to
make the right decisions in disposing of the bank's assets. We question
whether this principle can justify recent legislation that extends FDIC control
over the resolution of large bank holding companies. We _further consider
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four limits on our argument for FDIC control: (i) capital structure is
endogenous-the absence of claims junior to the FDIC may reflect the lack of
voice given to these claimants in a bank resolution process, (ii) agency costs
internal to the FDIC may prevent the FDIC from maximizing the recovery
from the failed bank's assets, (iii) the FDIC may not be the residual claimant
of extremely large banks with complex liability structures, and (iv) debt
conversion schemes which allow for automatic financial restructuring of a
failed bank may render bank resolution procedures less necessary. This
Article argues that these limits do not justify removing the EDIC from control
in resolving most bank failures.
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I. Introduction
Most nations resolve failed banks with the same procedures they apply
to other insolvent firms.' American law is different. American banks and
1. See Rosalind L. Bennett, Failure Resolution and Asset Liquidation: Results of an
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2thrifts do not receive bankcruptcy protection. Instead, regulators seize
insolvent or unsound banks or thrifts and give the Federal Deposit Insurance
Corporation (FDIC) the authority to resolve them. Almost always the FDIC
chooses to resolve seized institutions through a receivership.3 Very different
rules govern the bankruptcy and bank receivership processes. These rules
appear in different titles of the United States Code and have important
substantive differences. The most important difference between the two
procedures is the concentration of control over the disposition of the failed
firm's assets. The traditional bankruptcy reorganization divides control
among the various claimants and appoints a judge to supervise the process.
The overwhelming majority of reorganizations are resolved consensually
with the approval of each class of creditors and shareholders.4 Even when a
debtor tries to "cram down" a plan over the objections of dissenting creditors,
the debtor must win approval of at least some creditors, and the other
creditors can ask the judge to reject the plan because it fails to comply with
tests of horizontal and vertical equity or it is not in the best interests of the
creditors.'
Debtors sometimes bypass the traditional reorganization with a
relatively quick sale of many of the failed firm's assets or at least the assets
necessary for some of the business to continue operating. Although this
International Survey of Deposit Insurers, 14 FDIC BANKING Rnv. 1, 9 (2001) ("Outside the
United States, most failed banks go through a regular corporate bankruptcy process.').
2. See I11 U.S.C. §§ 109(b), (d) (2006) (stating that banks are ineligible for
bankruptcy, so that neither the bank nor the bank's creditors can place the bank in
bankruptcy). As noted below, bank holding companies can file for bankruptcy in the United
States, and many of the largest bankruptcies on record have been bank holding companies.
See infra note 31 and accompanying text (discussing the Washington Mutual, Inc.
bankruptcy).
3. The FDIC can decide to resolve the bank by a conservatorship or by a
receivership. Conservatorships are very rare, however. Between 1934 and 2005 only two
banks were resolved in conservatorships. See RicHARD S. CARNELL, JONATHAN R. MAcEY &
GEOFFREY P. MILLER, THE LAW OF BANKING AND FINANCIAL INSTITUTIONs 706 (4th ed.
2009) (discussing conservatorships as a mechanism to resolve a bank). For convenience, we
therefore use the term "bank receivership" to refer to any proceeding designed to resolve an
insolvent bank.
4. See Arturo Bris, Ivo Welch & Ning Zhu, The Costs of Bankruptcy. Chapter 7
Liquidation Versus Chapter 11 Reorganization, 41 J. FIN. 1253, 1256, 1274 (2006)
("Although the court can use 'cram down' to pass the plan and save time, no court used this
in our sample."); Lynne M. LoPucki & William C. Whitford, Bargaining Over Equity's
Share in the Bankruptcy Reorganization of Large, Publically Held Companies, 139 U. PA. L.
REV. 125, 141 (1990) (recognizing an extraordinarily high level of settlement).
5. See 11I U.S.C. § 1 129(b) (outlining the requirements for judicial approval of a
plan).
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quick sale denies the creditors the ability to 6vote on the sale, the debtor must
still seek approval of the bankruptcy judge,6 and the dissenting creditors can
at least ask the judge to enjoin the sale. The recent Chrysler bankruptcy
provides a nice illustration of this process. Within a few weeks of Chrysler's
bankruptcy filing, the debtor sold substantially all of its operating assets to a
"New" Chrysler owned by the UAW, Fiat and the U.S. and Canadian
governments.7 New Chrysler emerged from bankruptcy and continued
manufacturing and selling cars.8 The original corporate entities, and the few
assets that New Chrysler did not want, stayed in bankruptcy, and Old
Chrysler remains there over a year after its bankruptcy filing.9 Eventually the
bankruptcy process will conclude, and these remaining assets and the
proceeds of the sale to New Chrysler will be distributed to the creditors of
Old Chrysler. This sale occurred outside of a plan of reorganization, and the
creditors did not vote on the sale. However, a bankruptcy judge did approve
the sale, and the creditors had a right to, and did, argue that the approval
should have been denied. Apart from its notoriety, the way in which
Chrysler's principal assets were disposed of now is fairly typical in large
bankruptcy reorganizations. 10
A bank receivership begins when the FDIC seizes control of the bank.
In the vast majority of cases, the FDIC identifies an acquiring financial
institution before it seizes the failed bank.'" The acquirer will assume some
or all of the failed bank's deposits and perhaps some of the failed bank's
other liabilities as well. As consideration, the acquirer will receive some of
6. See id. § 363 (regulating the use, sale, or lease of property by a trustee).
7. See Mark H. Anderson & Jeff Bennett, Pension Funds Ask High Court to Delay
Sale of Chrysler, WALL ST. J., June 8, 2009, at B3 (discussing the Chrysler sale and the
action taken by junior creditors to stop the sale).
8. Id.
9. See Chrysler Restructuring Homepage, http://www.chryslerrestructuring.com (last
visited Sept. 25, 2010) (providing information about the restructuring of Chrysler) (on file
with the Washington and Lee Law Review).
10. See CONGRESSIONAL OVERSIGHT PANEL, SEPTEMBER OVERSIGHT REPORT: THE USE
OF TARP FUNDS IN THE SUPPORT AND REORGANIZATION OF THE DOMESTIC AUTOMOBILE
INDUSTRY (2009) (providing an overview of the Chrysler reorganization). Two features of
Chrysler's sale were somewhat unusual: The sold assets remained subject to certain
liabilities and interests, and the bidding was restricted to offers that assumed these liabilities
and interests. See id. ("[A]ssets can under appropriate circumstances be sold 'free and clear'
in a 363 sale, but that in Chrysler the buyer. ... took the assets subject to specified
obligations to the UAW Trust."). However, the timing and judicial approval of the sale
outside a reorganization plan were typical.
11. See infra Figure 1 (providing statistics on the method of resolution chosen by the
FDIC). The FDIC had identified an acquirer in every purchase and assumption ("PA" or
"Pl") transaction.
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the failed bank's assets and will nearly always receive a payment from the
FDIC. The FDIC usually retains most of the failed bank's assets 12 and takes
months or even years to liquidate these assets. 13  However, the initial
purchase and assumption occurs much more quickly than the initial sale of a
firm's assets in bankruptcy. The automobile bankruptcies generated
headlines because the sales were completed in a matter of weeks. A typical
purchase and assumption of a failed bank is quicker. The FDIC nearly
always seizes a failed bank at the close of business on a Friday,'14 and some of
the failed bank's offices may reopen as part of the acquiring bank the
following Monday.'"
The FDIC enjoys a level of control that a dominant creditor could only
dream of obtaining in bankruptcy. For one thing, the initial purchase and
assumption will be complete long before a judge can conceivably hear an
objection. Even if a creditor's objection is timely, the law significantly
restricts the grounds upon which a creditor can complain about the sale. For
instance, courts generally finid that applicable law does not allow the creditor
to complain that an alternative sale would have fetched a higher price.'16 The
12. See infra note 8 1 and accompanying text (discussing the amount of assets of the
failed bank that the acquirer acquires).
13. See Div. RESOLUTION & RECEIVERSH-IPS, ASSET DISPOSITION MANUAL 22 (1999)
(providing a timeline for the disposition of a failed bank's assets).
14. See FDIC: RESOLUTIONS HANDBOOK 16 (2003) ("The chartering authority closes
the institution and appoints the FDIC as receiver (usually on a Friday)."). The seizure of
Washington Mutual was a rare exception to this rule. See E. Scott Reckard & Tiffany Hsu,
Feds Seize, Sell WaMu in Biggest U.S. Bank Failure, L.A. TIMES, Sept. 26, 2008, at AlI ("in
the biggest bank failure in U.S. history, Washington Mutual Bank was seized late Thursday
by federal regulators and immediately sold. .... 1)
15. See Reckard & Hsu, supra note 14, at Al (noting that the transition would be
"seamless' and that there would not be any interruption in services provided to customers).
A typical example is the recent failure of IndyMac Bank. See Kathy M. Kristoff & Andrea
Chang, Federal Regulators Seize Crippled IndyMac Bank, L.A. TIMES, July 12, 2008, at AlI
("The federal government took control of Pasadena-based IndyMac bank on Friday in what
regulators called the second-largest bank failure in U.S. history."). The bank's thirty-three
branches were scheduled to reopen as branches of the acquirer (IndyMac Federal Bank) with
the resumption of normal business hours. See id. ("Normal branch hours, online banking
and phone banking services are to resume Monday."). Although the purchase and
assumption is resolved within days of the initiation of the receivership, the FDIC typically
spends about three months soliciting bids and preparing for the receivership. See John R.
Walter, Closing Troubled Banks, 90 ECON. Q. 51, 58 (2004) ("The FDIC then begins a
multistep process generally lasting 90 to 100 days, but which can proceed much more
quickly."). Similarly, insolvent nonbank firms can spend a great deal of time preparing for
their bankruptcy filing in order to minimize the duration of the proceedings.
16. See Mosseri v. FDIC, 2001 U.S. Dist. Lexis 18899, at *14 (S.D.N.Y. 2001)
("[C]ongress did not intend to create a private right of action for disappointed bidders for
FDIC assets under 12 U.S.C. § 1821(d)(13)(E)(i)-.(iii)."); 19 Court St. Assocs., LLC v.
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law also limits complaining creditors to a monetary remedy based on the
amount that they would have received in a liquidation of the bank's assets.
Further, a court cannot enjoin the FDIC's sale of the failed bank's assets."
Articles in the legal literature discuss the initiation of the bank resolution
process.'18 But there is surprisingly little discussion of what happens after the
process has been initiated. This Article focuses on the resolution process
itself The literature offers two possible reasons for giving the FDIC the
extraordinary control it has. The first is speed. 19 Control gives the FDIC the
ability to sell assets with no interference from other creditors and little
judicial oversight. This allows for quick resolutions. A swift resolution, in
turn, can ensure liquidity for depositors, increase depositors' confidence in
the banking system, and prevent runs on both failed and healthy banks. We
are not persuaded by this justification. The identified benefits of speed
depend on the timely reimbursement of insured depositors (a matter governed
by the terms of FDIC insurance) and not on the sale of the failed bank's
assets. In fact, the FDIC's own liquidation manual does not call for the
completion of the asset disposition until four years after the seizure of the
bank .20 The FDIC itself recognizes that disposing of all of the failed bank's
assets takes time.
The second reason for FDIC control is that it is likely the largest creditor
of the failed bank and therefore has an incentive to maximize the recovery
from the bank's assets .2 '1 But bankruptcy does not grant the largest creditor
Resolution Trust Corp. (In re 19 Court St. Assocs., LLC), 190 B.R. 983, 994 (Bankr.
S.D.N.Y. 1996) ("[A]s a disappointed bidder, Court Street does not have a private right of
action against the RTC for the alleged violation of the sections dealing with fair and
consistent treatment of offerors and with maximization of net value return on assets.").
17. See 12 U.S.C. § 1821(j) (2006) ("Except as provided in this section, no court may
take any action, except at the request of the Board of Directors by regulation or order, to
restrain or affect the exercise of powers or functions of the Corporation as a conservator or a
receiver. ").
18. See, e.g., David F. Skeel, The Law and Finance of Bank and Insurance Insolvency
Regulation, 76 TEx. L. REv. 723, 724 (1998) (discussing initiation issues and proposing
possible reforms); Peter P. Swire, Bank Insolvency Law Now That It Matters Again, 42
DuicE L.J. 469, 477-90 (1992) (discussing the nature of special bank insolvency law); see
also Douglas G. Baird, The Initiation Problem in Bankruptcy, 11I INT'L R~v. L. & EcoN.
223, 223-33 (199 1) (discussing the optimality of the procedure for initiating a bankruptcy).
19. See, e.g., Bennett, supra note 1, at 7 ("The liquidation system is governed by
receivership laws that seek to ensure the speedy resolution of banks and that therefore allow
the receiver broader powers than the bankruptcy laws allow.").
20. See supra note 13 and accompanying text (providing a timeline for the disposition
of a failed bank's assets).
21. See, e.g., Bennett, supra note 1, at 9 ("When Congress created the FDIC, it
believed that making the largest creditor (the FDIC) responsible for liquidating the assets of
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control over the resolution of nonbank firms. All claimants (including
shareholders) are given a voice to ensure that the largest creditor does not use
its control to their detriment. However, the available evidence suggests that
the FDIC is far more than the largest creditor. It is nearly always the residual
claimant on the failed bank's assets. As the residual claimant, it has the
incentive to make socially optimal decisions. The FDIC typically accounts
for the vast majority of the claims against the insolvent banks. 2 Claims
senior to those of the FDIC are nearly always paid in full, 23 while the FDIC
almost always loses at least some money.2 There are few uninsured deposits
that share with the FDIC on a pari-passu basis,25 and claims junior to the
FDIC almost never receive a distribution.2 Thus, in most cases the FDIC has
the financial incentive to sell the assets of the failed bank for their greatest
value. Unlike corporate bankruptcy, bank resolution procedures concentrate
decision-making in a single entity with the financial interest in making the
right decision about how to dispose of the assets.
Although we argue in favor of the concentration of control in the FDIC,
the case has four major caveats. First, a firm's capital structure depends at
least in part in the mechanism used to resolve failed firms; the lack of claims
junior to the FDIC may reflect the lack of voice given to these claims in a
bank resolution. Second, the FDIC does not make decisions, its employees
and directors do. As a government agency, the FDIC may not effectively
incentivize its employees to make wealth maximizing decisions. Despite this
limitation, however, FDIC control may be the best available alternative given
the current capital structure of most failed banks. In a very real sense, failed
banks have already been nationalized: Applicable priority rules assure that
the FDIC almost always owns a failed bank's assets. As a result, there are
few private parties with any real stake in ensuring that the resolution process
is well-run, and those that do exist are poorly placed to supervise the process.
Third, although the FDIC appears to have been the residual claimant in
nearly all of the bank insolvencies, it may not have been the residual claimant
for most of the assets that have passed through the bank insolvency process.
failed banks would simplify procedures. After all, it is in the best interest of the creditor to
obtain the maximum recovery as quickly as possible.").
22. See infra Table 1 (displaying the liability structure of failed banks).
23. See infra note 146 and accompanying text (discussing FDIC losses).
24. See infra Figure 2 and accompanying text (estimating FDIC losses as percent of
deposits).
25. See infra Table 1 (displaying the liability structure of failed banks).
26. See infra note 147 and accompanying text (noting the rarity with which general
claimants receive payments).
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The capital structure of our very largest banks makes it less likely that the
FDIC is the residual claimant, and the largest banks are dramatically bigger
than those that typically fail. A single failed bank, Washington Mutual,
accounts for more than 70% of all of the assets of banks that failed between
January of 1995 and the end of May of 2009,27 and the FDIC suffered no
losses from its closure.2 It is dangerous to draw conclusions from a sample
of one, but there are other reasons to believe that the FDIC would not be the
residual claimant if other extremely large banks failed. The law could adopt
special procedures for these banks that force the FDIC to share control.
However, doing so could generate substantial costs of their own, principally
in administering a special resolution scheme and in the incentives that it
would create. Finally, a number of scholars have suggested "automatic" debt
conversion methods designed to eliminate the need for formal bank
resolution procedures. This Article takes the capital structure of banks as
given and therefore does not address proposals that require changes in capital
structure such as the issuance of convertible debt. We also spend little time
on proposals that would apply without a change in capital structure because
these resolution methods will not complete the resolution process. Debt
conversion would leave the FDIC as the dominant shareholder of nearly all
failed banks. The FDIC is unlikely to want to operate the failed bank going
forward and would need to dispose of the assets.
This Article is structured as follows. Section UI contrasts bankruptcy
and the bank resolution process. Assessments of the existing bank resolution
system must take into account the capital structure of failed banks,
particularly their liability structure and loss to the FDIC in resolving failed
banks. Accordingly, Section III uses data from past bank failures to present
the best case for the existing bank resolution system. The best case, it
concludes, is a strong one. Section IV describes caveats that limit but do not
undermine that case. Section V applies these arguments to recent legislation
that extends the FDIC's control to certain insolvent bank holding companies.
Section VI concludes.
27. According to the FDIC, Washington Mutual Bank had assets of $307 billion; the
total value of assets of banks that failed between January 1, 1995 and October 19, 2009 was
$417 billion. The percentage of assets held by failed "mega-banks" rises considerably if one
includes the bank subsidiaries of Citigroup and Bank of America. However, these banks
received open-bank assistance and did not formally fail.
28. See infra note 179 and accompanying text (noting that the FDIC transferred most
of the assets to J.P. Morgan Chase bank as part of a purchase and assumption transaction).
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IL. Bankruptcy and Bank Insolvency
Most banks (and nearly all big banks) are owned by bank holding
companies. 29 Bank holding companies can, and do, file for bankruptcy, but
their bank subsidiaries are ineligible for bankruptcy relief.30 For example,
Washington Mutual, Inc. filed for bankrup tcy, 3 1  but its subsidiary,
Washington Mutual Bank, entered receivership and its resolution was
governed by a very different set of laws. This is more than just a matter of
the organization of statutes, administrative convenience, or discrete technical
rules. A more fundamental contrast concerns control: Unlike decision-
making under any of the Chapters of the Bankruptcy Code, the law of bank
resolution gives decision-making power to one party, the FDIC, and the
FDIC can exercise this power with almost no judicial review.
A. Dispersed Control in Bankruptcy
We argue that the primary difference between bankruptcy and bank
insolvency is the distribution of control. We therefore must describe the
distribution of control in bankruptcy. Control begins with the initiation of the
process, and the initiation decision is very different for a bank than it is for
other firms. Only a bank's primary regulator, 2 and the FDIC in some
cases, 33 can place it in receivership. By contrast, a nonbank firm can
29. See Bank Holding Companies and Financial Holding Companies, available at
http://www.fedpartnership.gov/bank-life-cycle/charts/bank-ownlership-by-bhcs.pdf (showing
that bank holding companies own over 83% of banks in the United States and almost all
banks with assets of at least one billion dollars).
30. See I11 U.S.C. § 109(b)(2), (d) (2006) (defining when a person may be a debtor
under chapter 7 of this title).
31. See 10 Largest Bankruptcies in the History of the USA, NYSE-TRADE.com, Aug.
16, 2009, http://nyse-trade.com/httpnyse-trade-ruI 0-krupnejshix-bankrotstv-v-istorii-ssha/
(last visited Sept. 30, 2010) (finding that Washington Mutual, Inc. is the second largest
bankruptcy on record, behind only Lehman Brothers Holdings, Inc.) (on file with the
Washington and Lee Law Review).
32. See, e.g., 12 U.S.C. § 1464(d)(2)(A) (2006) ("The Director of the Office of Thrift
Supervision may appoint a conservator or receiver for any insured savings association if the
Director determnines, in the Director's discretion, that 1 or more of the grounds specified in
section 1 I1(c)(5) of the Federal Deposit Insurance Act. ... exists."). The primary regulator is
the entity that has issued the bank's charter.
33. See id. § 1821(c)(4) (stating that in defined circumstances "the Corporation may
appoint itself as sole conservator or receiver of any insured State depository institution"); id.
§ 182 1(c)( 10) (stating that under certain circumstances the "Board of Directors may appoint
the Corporation as sole conservator or receiver of an insured depository institution").
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voluntarily file for bankruptcy,3 or a coalition of its creditors can force it into
bankruptcy if it is not paying its debts .3 ' For this reason, creditors have some
control over the initiation of a bankruptcy case; they have almost no control
in the initiation of the bank resolution process.3 A number of scholars have
examined control over the initiation decision.3 We focus instead on control
in the resolution process-on control once the process has started.
Control is the power to decide what to do with the firm's assets. It is a
continuous variable, not a discrete one. Accordingly, claimants can have
more or less control over that decision. In bankruptcy, stakeholders have
different degrees of control over asset sales, depending on the bankruptcy
Chapter under which the firm seeks relief. In Chapter 7, for example, the
firm's assets are liquidated by a trustee who can in turn be chosen by the
firm's unsecured creditors .38  The trustee decides how best to liquidate the
assets, but her decision is subject to judicial approval,3 9 and other
stakeholders can appear at the hearing and ask the court to stop the sale. The
presence of judicial oversight gives the trustee (and the unsecured creditors)
less than full control in the matter.
Most firms with asset sizes of even the smallest banks file in Chapter
11.40o In Chapter 11, the managers of the firm retain control as the "debtor in
34. See I11 U.S.C. § 301 ("A voluntary case under a chapter of this title is commenced
by the filing with the bankruptcy court of a petition under such chapter by an entity that may
be a debtor under such chapter.').
35. See id. § 303 ("An involuntary case against a person is commenced by the filing
with the bankruptcy court of a petition. ... by three or more entities, each of which is either a
holder of a claim against such person or an indenture trustee representing such a
holder. .. .)
36. See supra notes 32-35 and accompanying text (contrasting bankruptcy and
receivership procedures). Even ignoring involuntary bankruptcy, creditors can partially
control initiation by controlling access to credit or collateral. In theory, creditors could
influence the regulator's decision as to when to seize the bank. On the other hand, we show
below that nondeposit creditors play an insignificant role with most banks. See infra notes
121-23 (discussing the position of nondeposit creditors).
37. See supra note 18 (citing articles that examine initiation issues).
38. See I11 U.S.C. § 702 ("A creditor may vote for a candidate for trustee only if such
creditor holds an allowable, undisputed, fixed, liquidated, unsecured claim of a kind entitled
to distribution. .. .)
39. See id. § 363(b) (requiring judicial approval for sales outside the ordinary course
of business).
40. See Ed Flynn, Gordon Bermant Burke & Suzanne Hazard, Bankruptcy by the
Numbers, JUSTICE.Gov, http://www.justice.gov/ust/eo/public -affairs/articles/docsfabi 1220
02.htm (last visited Sept. 27, 2010) (stating that the total amount distributed from all Chapter
7 cases in 2002 was $1.45 billion, and only 1.2% of Chapter 7 cases had more than $500,000
in assets) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review). The very smallest bank
insolvency in our sample (Monument National Bank) had more than fourteen times this
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possession." As such, they exercise the powers of the trustee. 4 1 If the firm is
to emerge from bankruptcy, the managers must win confirmation of a plan of
reorganization.4 This plan will answer three fundamental questions. First,
how will the assets of the firm be used? Second, what is the value of the
firm's assets? Third, how will the proceeds of the assets be divided amongst
the various claimants?
There are two ways for a plan to be confirmed. One is by the consent of
creditors .4 ' The other is by judicial confirmation of the plan under prescribed
conditions over the objection of creditors."4 Creditor consent is determined
by complicated voting procedures that can grant substantial power to
minority creditors. Claims and interests are divided into classes, and half of
the claims cast (two-thirds by value) of each class must vote in favor of the
plan .45 Dissimilar claims, such as secured and unsecured claims, cannot be
placed in the same class,46 and consensual confirmations require unanimity
among classes.47 Thus, a group of creditors or even equity holders can block
confirmation if they believe that they are entitled to or can demand more.
Junior claimants can sometimes demand more simply because the alternative
to a consensual plan is so difficult and costly. Most significantly, the court
must determine that the plan achieves both horizontal equity (the plan does
not unreasonably discriminate between creditors of equal priority) and
vertical equity (the plan does not pay junior creditors anything if senior
amount in assets ($7,680,000).
41. See I11 U.S.C. § 1107(a) (requiring judicial approval for sales outside the ordinary
course of business).
42. This assumes that the plan will be confirmed during the period in which only the
debtor can propose a plan.
43. See I11 U.S.C. § 1129(a) (stating that a court will only confirm a plan if "each class
of claims or interest. ... has accepted the plan").
44. See id § 1129(b) (stating that the court will confirm the plan without the creditors'
consent if "the plan does not discriminate unfairly, and is fair and equitable with respect to
each class or interest that is impaired under, and has not accepted, the plan").
45. See id. § 1126(c) ("A class of claims has accepted a plan if such plan has been
accepted by creditors .. , that hold at least two-thirds in amount and more than one-half in
number of the allowed claims of such class held by creditors.. . that have accepted or
rejected such plan.").
46. See id. § 11I22(a) ("Except as provided in subsection (b) of this section, a plan may
place a claim or an interest in a particular class only if such claim or interest is substantially
similar to the other claims or interests of such class.").
47. See id. § 11 29(a)(8) ("The court shall confirm a plan only if... with respect to
each class of claims or interests such class has accepted the plan; or such class is not
impaired under the plan.").
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creditors are not paid in full). 48  Because plans will rarely pay everyone in
cash, these findings require complex and time-consuming fact-finding. For
this reason, most confirmed reorganization plans are consensual.4
Both consensual and nonconsensual confirmations take time, and the
Code authorizes management to make day-to-day operating decisions prior to
confirmation."' The Code also allows management to make some decisions,
with court approval, that are not in the ordinary course of the debtor's
business.51 Among the most important is management's decision, usually at
the urging of a creditor, to sell some or most of the debtor's assets.
Bankruptcy practitioners have found that they can use this power to
determine how the assets will be used without having to seek plan approval.
Chapter 11I sales of going concerns outside a reorganization plan, while once
rare, have now become frequent.5
48. See id. § 1 129(b) (requiring a plan to be fair and equitable).
49. See supra note 4 and accompanying text (recognizing that an overwhelming
majority of reorganizations are resolved consensually with the approval of each class of
creditors and shareholders).
50. 11 U.S.C. § 363.
5 1. Id § 363(b)(1).
52. See Douglas G. Baird, The New Face of Chapter 11, 12 Am. BANKR. INST. L. REv.
69, 71 (2004) ("Today, creditors of insolvent businesses ... no longer need a substitute for a
market sale. Instead of providing a substitute for a market sale, chapter 11 now serves as the
forum where such sales are conducted."); Douglas G. Baird & Robert K. Rasmussen,
Chapter I11 at Twilight, 56 STAN. L. REV. 673, 674 (2003) ("Hence, modem Chapter 11I
practice cannot be squared with the traditional account. Regardless of whether the number
of businesses entering Chapter 11I rises or falls, something different is going on."); Douglas
G. Baird & Robert K. Rasmussen, The End of Bankruptcy, 55 STAN. L. REV. 751, 751 (2002)
("Corporate reorganizations have all but disappeared. Giant corporations make headlines
when they file for Chapter 11, but they are no longer using it to rescue a firm from imminent
failure. Many use Chapter 11I merely to sell their assets and divide up the proceeds."); see
generally George W. Kuney, Hijacking Chapter 11, 21 EMORY BANKR. DEv. J. 19 (2004).
According to the literature, Chapter 11I sales of going concerns outside a reorganization plan
were unusual between 1978 and the mid-1990s. By 2000, such sales were frequent, not the
exception. In 2002, for instance, a majority of large firms in Chapter 11I were sold in one
form or another. Note that the classification of asset dispositions into reorganizations or
asset sales is somewhat subjective. Nearly every bankrupt debtor in Chapter 11
reorganization will use § 363 to sell at least some assets. Section 363(b) authorizes the sale
of assets in the ordinary course without court approval. The trustee, acting as the debtor in
possession, often will sell assets to maintain liquidity or avoid losses on assets with
declining values. We are more interested in sales of substantial portions of the firm outside
of the ordinary course of business. By one count, about 16% were auctioned by means of a
363 sale. See LYNN M. LoPucKi, COURTING JUSTICE 170-71 (2005) (providing sale
distributions). The trend continues to be prevalent to date. See Mike Specter, GM Asset
Sale Gets Judge's Nod, WALL ST. J., July 6, 2009, at BRI (providing a summary of the GM
sale); see also CONGRESSIONAL OVERSIGHT PANEL, supra note 10 (providing a summary of
the details of sale of both Chrysler and GM).
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The recent automobile bankruptcies provide salient examples of this
trend. The Chrysler and General Motors groups filed for bankruptcy
protection under Chapter 11. Rather than seek approval of their creditors to a
plan of reorganization, each quickly sold its most valuable assets to newly
formed entities in exchange for cash and the assumption of some of the old
firms' liabilities."3 The old corporate groups remained behind in bankruptcy
with the unwanted assets and the disfavored creditors, but the press reported
that the firms emerged from bankruptcy. As a practical matter the press was
correct: The firm's critical assets and operations emerged from bankcruptcy;
only the disfavored creditors and assets retained by the old corporate shells
remained behind.
This description implies that management controls the process of
disposing of assets. As a formal matter it does. As a practical matter,
however, creditors often decide how the firm's assets will be disposed
because they enjoy sufficient leverage to effectively dictate the
management's decisions.5 Once again, the automobile bankruptcies provide
a good example. The continued existence of Chrysler and General Motors
(and thus the fate of the senior management) largely depended on continued
funding. Only the federal government was willing to lend. Management was
understandably loath to make decisions that would anger the administration.
Similarly, management of other bankrupt firms may be unwilling to make
decisions that would anger their dominant creditors, particularly if these
creditors included strong covenants in their loan agreements. Management
jeopardizes its continued employment with the firm and perhaps future
employment prospects by making decisions that creditors with leverage
dislike.55 However, neither management nor a dominant creditor will have
53. See Mike Specter, GMAsset Sale Gets Judge's Nod, WALL ST. J., July 6, 2009, at
B 1 (providing a summary of the GM sale); see also CONGRESSIONAL OVERSIGHT PANEL,
supra note 10 (providing a summary of the details of sale of both Chrysler and GM).
54. See Douglas G. Baird, The New Face of Chapter 11, 12 Am. BANKR. L. REv. 69,
75 (2004) ("The ability of creditors to control their debtor and negotiate with each other
outside of chapter 11I is now vastly greater than it was during the equity receivership-or
even in chapter I11 just 20 years ago."); Barry E. Adler et al., Destruction of Value in the
New Era of Chapter I1I1 (N.Y.U. Stem Sch. of Bus. Research Paper Series, Working Paper
No. CLB-06-032, 2006). available at http://papers.ssm.com/sol3/papers.cfin?abstract-id=
1291620 (noting that it is common for creditors to control the bankruptcy process); Kenneth
M. Ayotte & Edward R. Morrison, Creditor Control and Conflict in Chapter I111 (Columbia
Univ. Ctr. for Law & Econ., Research Paper No. 321 and Northwestern Univ. Law Sch. Law
& Econ. Research Paper Series, No. 08-16 (2008), available at http://papers.ssm.coml
soI3/papers.cfln?abstract-id=1081661 (finding pervasive creditor control in the bankruptcy
process).
55. See M. Todd Henderson, Paying CEOs in Bankruptcy: Executive Compensation
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complete control. By selling assets outside of the plan of reorganization, they
successfully deprive other claimants of the right to vote to block the sale. But
they must still seek judicial approval of the sale, and these other claimants
have the right to argue that the sale is not in the best interest of the claimants
as a group. Management, on the sale proponents' behalf, must provide a
business reason for the sale, and it must convince the court that the sale
maximizes the value of the estate. Thus, in an important sense, management,
dominant creditors and the bankruptcy court share control over disposal of
the finm's assets. As we note below, a single creditor, the FDIC, enjoys
complete control over bank resolutions. The sale of a bank's assets does not
require judicial approval.
B. Bank Insolvencies and the Purchase and Assumption Agreement
Bank receiverships and bankruptcy proceedings operate under
significantly different rules.5 6  The differences include the procedure for
determining claims, the right to repudiate contracts, stays of litigation, and
the power to avoid certain transactions. Claims against a nonbank debtor are
allowed or disallowed by the bankruptcy court, and its determination can be
appealed.5 By contrast, the authority to disallow claims is given to the




The FDIC has to power to repudiate or perform contracts entered into by the
failed bank ;59 the bankruptcy trustee can reject or assume only contracts that
When Agency Costs Are Low, 101 Nw. U. L. REv. 1543, 1595-96 (2007) (discussing how
Chapter I11 is no longer "an entrenchment mechanism for managers that allows them to stay
in power and extract rents from the firm"); Stuart C. Gilson & Michael R. Vetsuypens, CEO
Compensation in Financially Distressed Firms: An Empirical Analysis, 48 J. FIN. 425, 456
(1993) (reviewing management compensation policies for firms that have filed for
bankruptcy and finding that nearly one-third of all CEOs are being replaced).
56. American banks have been barred from bankruptcy courts since the inception of
the first lasting bankruptcy act in 1898. See Bankruptcy Act of 1898, ch. 541 § 4(b), 30 Stat.
544, 547 (explaining "who may become bankrupt" under the Act). Prior to 1933, state
receivership law controlled state bank failures, and federal law governed national bank
failures. Today, the Federal Deposit Insurance Act governs failures of FDIC-member banks.
57. See 11 U.S.C. § 502 (2006) ("[I1f such objection to a claim is made, the court, after
notice and a hearing shall determine the amount of such claim .. 1)
58. See 12 U.S.C. § 1821(d)(5)(E) (2006) ("No court may review the Corporation's
determination pursuant to subparagraph (D) to disallow a claim."). Courts rarely disagree
with the FDIC's disallowance of a claim. See, e.g., Adagio Inv. Holdings Ltd. v. FDIC, 338
F. Supp. 2d 71, 79 (D.D.C. 2004) ("FDIC-R makes much of its broad power as a receiver,
but these powers are not without limits . . . .)
59. See 12 U.S.C. § 182 1(e)(1) ("In addition to any other rights a conservator or
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are executory.6 Litigation against the failed bank is not automatically stayed
while the bank's failure is being resolved. The FDIC must submit a timely
request asking a court to enjoin litigation;61 and courts disagree as to whether
they must comply with the request .6  Applicable law does not otherwise
prevent creditors from enforcing their property rights in the failed bank's
assets.6 Bankruptcy's automatic stay prevents the enforcement of property
interests (such as security interests) in the assets of the debtor.64 Finally,
certain payments made by nonbank firms to their creditors are recoverable by
the firms' trustees as preferences .6 ' Depositors are creditors of their
depository banks. However, withdrawals by depositors before the bank fails
are not recoverable by the FDIC as preferences. The FDIC's power to avoid
fraudulent transfers by the failed bank is more limited than the comparable
power given to the bankruptcy trustee. Unlike the bankruptcy trustee's
power' 66 the FDIC's avoidance power requires actual fraud ;6 1 constructive
fraud is insufficient. These are important difference between bank and
bankruptcy insolvency rules. However, we argue that the most critical
receiver may have, the conservator or receiver for any insured depository institution may
disaffirm or repudiate any contract or lease .. . .)
60. See 11 U.S.C. § 365(a) ("[Tlhe trustee, subject to the court's approval, may
assume or reject any executory contract or unexpired lease of the debtor.").
61. See 12 U.S.C. § 1821(d)(12)(A) ("After the appointment of a conservator or
receiver for an insured depository institution, the conservator or receiver may request a stay
for a period not to exceed 45 days, in the case of a conservator; and 90 days in the case of
any receiver .. . .")
62. Compare Wachovia Bank, N.A. v. Michael Taylor, 2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 83793,
at *5 (W.D. Mich. Nov. 13, 2007) (finding that "a stay is mandatory and must be granted"),
with FDIC v. Taylor, 727 F. Supp. 326, 328 (S.D. Tex. 1989) (finding that the stay is
permissive because "[tlhe statute was not enacted to give FDIC the power to stay
proceedings to which it is a party at any point, regardless of the length of its involvement.").
63. See FDIC Advisory Opinion: Self-Help Liquidation of Collateral by Second
Claimants in Insured Depository Receiverships (Dec. 15. 1989). FDIC 89-49 ("[I]t is my
opinion that such a secured creditor of an insured depository institution for which a receiver
had been appointed could liquidate the creditor's properly pledged collateral by
commercially reasonable 'self-help' methods, provided that no involvement of the receiver
was required. ... ).
64. See 11I U.S.C. § 362 (stating that a petition operations as a stay of "the
enforcement, against the debtor or against the property of the estate, of a judgment obtained
before the commencement of the case under this title").
65. See id. § 547 (discussing when transferees may or may not avoid a transfer).
66. See id. § 548(a)(1) (outlining the bankruptcy trustee's avoidance power).
67. See 12 U.S.C. § 1821l(d)(17) (2006) (stating that the FDIC may avoid a transfer or
incurrence of any liability only if such action was made with "the intent to hinder, delay, or
defraud").
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differences are the allocation of control over the resolution process and the
distribution of losses among claimants.
Somewhat different priority rules order claims against banks and
nonbanks. Regardless of whether the firm is a bank or nonbank, secured
claims have first priority with respect to their collateral,6 administrative
expenses should be paid before unsecured creditors' 69 and subordinated debt
and equity should receive nothing unless general unsecured creditors are paid
in full. The priority rules differ, however, in the extent by which they
distinguish between unsecured creditors. Bankruptcy does grant some
unsecured creditors priority over others; for example, workers and customers
are given limited priority over general claimants.7 In large corporate
bankruptcies these priority claims do not typically account for a substantial
portion of the total claims .7 1  By contrast, banking law grants priority to
domestic deposits over foreign deposits and general claims .7 ' The FDIC
insures domestic deposits up to an amount that varies over time, currently
$250,0O0,7' and becomes subrogated to the claims of these creditors.
68. See id. § 1821(11)(A) (outlining the order of priority for collateral); 11 U.s.c.
§ 725 ("After the commencement of a case under this chapter .. . the trustee. ... shall
dispose of any property in which an entity other than the estate has an interest, such as a lien,
and that has not been disposed of under another section of this title.").
69. See 12 U.S.C. § 182 1(d)(l l)(A)(i) (stating that the "administrative expenses of the
receiver" have priority over unsecured creditors); 11I U.S.C. § 507(a)(2) (placing
administrative expenses before unsecured claims in the order of priority).
70. See 11 U.S.C. § 507(a)(4) ("Fourth, allowed unsecured claims, but only to the
extent of $10,000 for each individual or corporation. . . ."); id § 507(a)(7) ("Seventh,
allowed unsecured claims of individuals, to the extent of $1,800 for each such
individual . .. ")
71. See Elizabeth Warren & Jay Westbrook, Contracting Out of Bankruptcy, 118
HARv. L. REV. 1197, 1243 (2004) (showing that employee wage claims account for 8.8% of
the debt of business debtors in 1994). Bankrupt debtors do, however, sometimes repay
"critical vendors" at the outset of the case even though other creditors will not be repaid in
full. However, the authority to do so is unclear. See In re Kmart Corp., 359 F.3d 866, 874
(7th Cir. 2004) ("Even if § 362(b)(1) allows critical-vendors in principle, preferential
payments to a class of creditors are proper only if the record shows the prospect of benefit to
the other creditors.").
72. See 12 U.S.C. § 1813(l)(5) (stating that "any deposit liability of the institution"
receives preference over "any other general or senior liability of the institution").
73. See Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection (Dodd-Frank) Act,
Pub. L. No. 111-203, §§ 201(a)(l 1), 101(a)(1) (West, Westlaw through 2010 legislation),
H.R. 4173, 111Ith Cong. §§ 201(a)(1 1), 202(a)(1) (2010) (to be codified at 12 U.S.C. § 5323)
(defining the term "financial company" and instructing how to properly commence an
orderly liquidation); 12 U.S.C. § 1821(a)(l)(A) (2006) ("The Corporation shall insure the
deposits of all insured depository institutions as provided in this chapter."). The insurance
limit applies to the depositor, not the deposit. See id § 1813(m)(1) ("[Tj1he term 'insured
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Figure 1: Failure and Assistance
Transactions from 1/ 1/2005 to
5/31/2009
Figure 1 presents the FDIC's June 2009 categorization of how it dealt
with troubled banks between January of 1995 and May of 2009.~ The FDIC
can provide assistance without closing the bank (the FDIC calls these
"Assistance Transactions" or "AlA",).75 This includes purchasing nonvoting
securities in the bank or assuming some of its liabilities .76 Its purpose is to
deposit' means the net amount due to any depositor for deposits in an insured depository
institution as determined under sections 1817(i) and 1821 (a) of this title.').
74. In generating Figure 1, we calculate each bank as a separate transaction even if the
banks are part of a related family. For example, the assistance that the FDIC provided to
Citigroup and its affiliates counted as five transactions because there were five banks. All
figures and tables presented in this Article reflect the data we gathered in the summer of
2009. The FDIC occasionally revises this data. For example, Figure 1 does not include the
assistance provided to Bank of America and its affiliates in January of 2009 because these
transactions were not added to the FDIC database until after June of 2009.
75. See 12 U.S.C. § 1823(c)(1) ("The Corporation is authorized, in its sole discretion
and upon such terms and conditions as the Board of Directors may prescribe, to make loans
to, to make deposits in, to purchase the assets or securities of, to assume the liabilities of, or
to make contributions to, any insured depository institution . . . ."); id. § 1 823(c)(3) ("The
Corporation may provide any person acquiring control of, merging with, consolidating with
or acquiring the assets of an insured depository institution under subsection (f) or (k) of this
section with such financial assistance as it could provide an insured institution under this
subsection."). Another open bank transaction is a reprivatization in which management
takes over the bank and sells it with or without the assistance of the FDIC. We do not
discuss this transaction as it has not been used since 1989 and has been used just three times
since 1934.
76. Id. § 1821(a)(3), (c)(5).
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reinforce the capital of a troubled bank, making the bank more attractive to
investors, and avoid having put the bank through the resolution process.
Assistance transactions are rare, however. The only assistance transactions
that occurred in our sample period were the FDIC's assistance to the five
bank subsidiaries of Citigroup 7 and the eight bank subsidiaries of Bank of
America.
If the FDIC decides to close a failed bank, it has several options. It can
simply pay the insured depositors what they are owed (a "pay-out" or PO) or
transfer the insured deposits to another bank (an "insured deposit transfer" or
IDT). In both cases, the FDIC liquidates the assets of the bank and
distributes the proceeds in accordance with the priority structure. Like open-
bank assistance, these choices of resolution are rare, occurring only about 8%
(6% P0 and 2% lDT) of the time since 1995.
In 88% of cases the FDIC found a bank that was willing to assume some
or all of the failed bank's liabilities and purchase some or all of the failed
bank's assets. In a significant portion of the cases (34%), the acquirer
assumed only the insured liabilities (a purchase and assumption of insured
deposits, or "P1"). However, most of the time (54%), the acquirer assumed
some of the uninsured deposits as well (a purchase and assumption agreement
or "P'A"). These transactions also vary in the nature of the assets acquired.
The standard purchase and acquisition contract grants the acquirer the option
to purchase the physical assets of the bank (the offices, furniture, etc .),79 but
on average these assets account for only about 2.3% of total assets; the
77. The FDIC and the U.S. Treasury guaranteed $306 billion of loans and securities
held by these banks. Under a loss sharing arrangement both agreed to bear part of the banks'
losses on these assets above $29 billion, up to stipulated amounts. The arrangement also
gave the FDIC and Treasury preferred shares in Citicorp's banks. See Press Release, Joint
Statement by Treasury, Federal Reserve and FDIC on Citigroup (Nov. 23, 2008),
http://www.federalreserve.gov/newsevents/Press/bcreg/2008 11 23a.htm (last visited Sept. 28,
2010) ("As a fee for this arrangement, Citigroup will issue preferred shares to the Treasury
and FDIC.") (on tile with the Washington and Lee Law Review).
78. The FDIC and the U.S. Treasury guaranteed the value of $118 billion of assets
held by Bank of America and its subsidiaries. In return the FDIC and the Treasury received
preferred shares in Bank of America. See Press Release, Treasury, Federal Reserve and the
FDIC Provide Assistance to Bank of America (Jan. 16, 2009), http://www.fdic.gov/
news/news/press/2009/pr09004.htmlI (last visited Sept. 28, 2010) ("Treasury and the Federal
Deposit Insurance Corporation will provide protection against the possibility of unusually
large losses on an asset pool of approximately $118 billion of loans, securities backed by
residential and commercial real estate loans, and other such assets . . . .") (on file with the
Washington and Lee Law Review).
79. See generally FDIC, PURCHASE AssumpTioN AGREEMENT (2009), available ai
http://www.fdic.govlbank/individual/failed/sbP-andA.pdf (providing a sample purchase
and assumption agreement).
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primary assets of the bank are its cash, loans and securities. 80 In most cases
(51%) the acquirer acquired less than one-quarter of the assets of the failed
bank;8' the remaining assets were sold by the FDIC in the ensuing months or
even years.82 When the acquirer acquired the majority of the assets of the
failed bank, the FDIC usually entered into a loss-sharing agreement so that it
retained much of the risk of a decline in value. The typical arrangement
divides loss around specific acquired assets by threshold amounts or
"tranches." In the first tranche the acquirer bears all loss up to a
predetermined threshold amount. Loss in the second tranche is shared
between the FDIC and acquirer, with the FDIC bearing most of it. The FDIC
bears almost all of the loss in the third tranche .83  Of the twenty-nine
insolvencies in which the acquirer purchased more than three-quarters of the
firm's assets, the FDIC entered loss-sharing agreements in eighteen of the
transactions. This ratio rises to sixteen of nineteen transactions in the
banking crisis of 2008 and 2009. The FDIC entered into just one loss-sharing
transaction in the sixty-nine transactions in which the acquirer took less than
three-quarters of the failed bank's assets.
Since 1991, Congress has required the FDIC to choose the resolution
method that imposes the least cost on the insurance fund, unless the FDIC
determines that doing so is necessary to avert systemic risk .8  However, in
order to invoke this exception to the least cost rule the FDIC must obtain the
approval of the Chairman of the Federal Reserve and the Treasury Secretary,
and they must consult with the President .8 ' This exception has been invoked
80. See FREDERICK S. MisHKiN, THE ECONOMICS OF MONEY, BANKING AND FINANCIAL
MARKETs 226 (9th ed. 2010) (illustrating that in 2008, nine percent of total commercial bank
assets were 'other assets,' which include physical capital).
81. In about 51% of the Purchase and Assumption (PA, PI and P&A) transactions for
which the FDIC provided data on the assets acquired the acquiring bank purchased less than
25% of the failed bank's assets. In another 12% of these transactions the acquirer purchased
between 25% and 50% of the assets. The remaining transactions were between 50% and
75% (7% of transactions) and 75% and 100% (30% of transactions).
82. See supra note 13 and accompanying text (providing a timeline for the disposition
of a failed bank's assets).
83. See, e.g., Purchase and Assumption Agreement of FDIC and Wilshire State Bank,
June 26, 2009, § 4.15, available at http://www.fdic.govlbanklindividuallfailedlmirae_
P _andA.pdf (outlining the agreement with respect to loss sharing between the parties).
84. See 12 U.S.C. § 1823(c)(4)(A) (2006) (providing the limited circumstances under
which the least-cost resolution method will not be required).
85. See id. § 1 823(c)(4)(G) (stating that 'the Corporation may take other action or
provide assistance under this section as necessary to avoid or mitigate such effects" with the
approval of the Board of Directors, the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System,
and thet Secretary of the Treasury).
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just twice since 1995 in order to provide assistance to Citigroup, Bank of
America and their subsidiaries.8 Prior to the adoption of the least cost
standard, the FDIC used standards that allowed them to consider, among
other things, the impact of a bank closure on a community. 7 Congress
worried that the FDIC was too willing to consider these other factors and too
willing to pay an acquiring bank to assume all of the liabilities of the failed
firm, not just the insured liabilities. The effect of such payments was to use
the federal deposit insurance fund to subsidize payments to uninsured
depositors and other creditors because the FDIC typically would have to pay
an acquiring bank more to assume all of a failed bank's deposits than assume
only its insured deposits. Accordingly, some observers believed that
resolutions involving the assumption of all deposits would become the
exception rather than the norm as they would not satisfy the least cost
requirement.8 Data on the form of resolution used by the FDIC between
1995 and 2009 clearly show that this has not been the case as transactions in
which the acquirer assumes some uninsured deposits outnumber those in
which they do not by a factor of about two to one.8
Some purchase and assumption transactions can be quite similar to
bankruptcies that utilize Section 363 to sell all or substantially all of the
assets. Both processes can be used to quickly transfer the core assets or
goodwill of the failed entity to an acquirer. Assets not transferred are
retained for months or even years before being liquidated and creditors paid
in accordance with the relevant priority rules.90 However, the processes
86. The FDIC also invoked this exception when approving financing for Citibank's
bid to buy Wachovia. See Editorial, Who's Too Big to Fail?, WALL ST. J., Sept. 13, 2009, at
A14 ("To provide assistance, the [FDIC] board had to invoke the 'systemic risk' exception
in the Federal Deposit insurance Act .. . ."). However, this transaction was not
consummated as Wells Fargo purchased Wachovia instead. See id ("Yet days later,
Wachovia cut a better deal to sell itself to Wells Fargo, instead of Citi.").
87. Prior to 1991, the Federal Deposit Insurance Act required the FDIC to dispose of a
failed bank's assets in such a way that the cost to the insurance fund was less than the cost to
it of paying off insured deposits. 12 U.S.C. § 1823(c)(4)(A). However, 12 U.S.C
§ 1 823(c)(4)(A) recognized an exception allowing the FDIC to use a method of disposal not
satisfying this "less cost" standard if the failed bank was deemed essential to its conununity.
Id.
88. See Skeel, supra note 18, at 771 ("As a result, the current framework should curtail
significantly regulators' ability to favor purchase and assumption transactions over
liquidation and insured deposit transfers.").
89. See supra Figure 1 (graphing failure and assistance transactions from 2005 to
2009). The dominance of PA transactions is even more apparent if we expand our sample to
include all transactions from 1991 through May of 2009. During this period there were 135
PI transactions and 513 PA or P&A transactions.
90. Lehman Brothers Holdings, Inc.'s bankruptcy shows the same pattern. See
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differ in three fundamental ways. First, the initial stage of the bank resolution
process is much faster than even the quickest bankruptcy. Chrysler and
General Motors were notable because the sales were completed in a matter of
weeks, and the fastest 363 sales take more than a week.9' In every completed
purchase and assumption transaction, the FDIC completed the sale of the
failed bank simultaneously with its seizure.
Second, the standards for determining the method of resolutions are not
the same. Surprisingly, the Bankruptcy Code does not provide the judge with
an explicit standard for approving sales outside of the ordinary course of
business. 92 The standard has been left to courts, which typically require the
sales proponent to articulate a "sound business reason" for the sale.9 Many
courts and commentators believe that the judge should approve a transaction
if, and only if, it increases the aggregate return of all parties with legal claims
against the failed entity.9 Other commentators disagree. They believe that
the court should also consider the interests of other stakeholders who lack a
legal claim such as workers or the local community.95 Congress explicitly
rejected this broader "stakeholder" standard in the context of bank
insolvencies when its own money was on the line.9 It did, however, provide
a possible exception in the case of systemic risk, but this exception requires
an acknowledgement of those who face far more political accountability than
Lehman's Collapse: A Timeline, DEAL, Sept. 26, 2009, http://www.thedeal.com/dealscape/
2009/09 (last visited Sept. 30, 2010) (providing a timeline of the collapse of Lehman
Brothers Holdings, Inc.) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review). The largest
bankruptcy in U.S. history, Lehman's North American investment banking unit and
headquarters was sold in a 363 sale within a week of its bankruptcy filing. Id. Other core
units were sold within weeks later. Still other assets were auctioned approximately three
months after the filing. Id.
91. LYNN M. LoPuclo, COURTING FAILURE: How COMPETITION FOR BIG CASES IS
CORRUPTING THE BANKRUPTCY COURTS 171-72 (2005).
92. See 11I U.S.C. § 363 (2006) (governing the use of sale or lease in the ordinary
course of business).
93. See Comm. of Equity Sec. Holders v. Lionel Corp. (In re Lionel Corp.), 722 F.2d
1063, 1070 (2d Cir. 1983) ("The rule we adopt requires that a judge determining a § 363(b)
application expressly find from the evidence presented before him at the hearing a good
business reason to grant such an application.").
94. See, e.g., Douglas G. Baird, Bankruptcy's Uncontested Axioms, 108 YALE L.J. 573,
576 (1998) (identifying and contrasting two separate approaches of bankruptcy experts);
Douglas G. Baird, Loss Distribution, Forum Shopping, and Bankruptcy: A Reply to Warren,
54 U. CHI. L. REv. 815, 833 (1987) (arguing the basis of bankruptcy policy in the context of
business bankruptcies and defending the "creditors' bargain" approach).
95. See, e.g., Elizabeth Warren, Bankruptcy Policy, 54 U. CHI. L. R~v. 775, 778-93
(1987) (expounding upon the traditional conception of the purposes of bankruptcy).
96. Supra notes 84-85 and accompanying text.
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a bankruptcy judge.97 Significantly, this exception has only been invoked
twice to preserve groups of banks owned by Citigroup and Bank of
America.9
The third difference is the most significant. While control of the
bankruptcy process is divided among all of the claimants, control over a bank
receivership is concentrated in the FDIC. Bankruptcy provides all claimants
with the opportunity to vote on the plan and to at least object to a sale outside
of the ordinary course of business.99 When objecting to the sale, claimants
can, and do, argue that the sale of the assets would yield more if the assets
had been marketed in another manner or if an alternative buyer had been
chosen. If the judge believes that the dissenters have the better of the
argument, she can enjoin the sale. By contrast, claimants on the assets of the
failed bank have neither the right to vote on the sale of the key assets of the
bank nor the ability to seek an injunction from a court.100 They can, and
sometimes do, seek damages if they believe that the FDIC made poor
decisions. However, claimants are entitled only to the difference between
what they received and the amount that they would have received in
liquidation.' 01 They have no entitlement to any going concern value of the
bank.102
Xl. The Case for FDIC Contfrol of Bank Insolvencies
We argue that the key difference between a bank receivership and a
bankruptcy proceeding is the concentration of control in a single decision
97. Supra notes 84-85 and accompanying text.
98. The FDIC also invoked this rule to arrange Citibank's acquisition of Wachovia,
but Wachovia was ultimately sold to Wells Fargo. See Joe Adler, Wachovia Deal Forces
FDIC to Use Systemic Tool, Am. BANKER, Sept. 30, 2008, at 4 ("The Federal Deposit
Insurance Corp. used the 'systemic risk' exception for the first time in history Monday so it
could creatively find a way to sell Wachovia Corp.'s assets to Citigroup Inc. while
protecting the government from losses.").
99. See supra notes 39-40 and accompanying text (describing the bankruptcy
process).
100. See 12 U.S.C. § 1821(d)(13)(D) (2006) (stating no court shall have jurisdiction
over "any claim or action for payment from, or any action seeking a determination of rights
with respect to, the assets of any depository institution for which the Corporation has been
appointed receiver").
101. See id. § 1821 (i)(2) ("The maximum liability. ... shall equal the amount such
claimant would have received if the Corporation had liquidated the assets and liabilities of
such institution.. .. )
102. Id.
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maker-the FDIC. The FDIC is not a neutral arbitrator, and the
concentration of control in its hands can impose costs if it acts against the
interests of other creditors. 103 The literature offers two plausible justifications
for this concentration of control. First, it allows for much greater speed and
secrecy, and this speed and secrecy could yield benefits in banking. Second,
concentration of control is appropriate to the extent that the FDIC is the
largest creditor and will wish to maximize the value of the assets of the firm.
We find the first justification unconvincing. However, if we recast the
second justification to say that the FDIC is the residual claimant on the assets
of most failed banks, it provides a strong rationale for FDIC control.
A. The Benefits of Speed and Secrecy
Numerous commentators ask whether banking regulators act with
sufficient speed when seizing failing institutions. 1 04 Banks are highly
leveraged, much more so than nonfinancial firms.'05 This high leverage
means that relatively small shocks can quickly render the firm insolvent. The
relatively liquid nature of the bank's assets means that the moral hazard
created by insolvency or near-insolvency can be severe. Banks that are
insolvent or close to insolvent can easily deploy their assets quickly to
increase risk and exploit the option value of equity in a nearly insolvent firm.
The dispersion of depositors makes coordination difficult, and thus initiation
rules that differ from those that apply in bankruptcy may be justified. This
Article does not, however, address the speed with which the regulator
103. Writing just after the bank crises of 1930-1933, Cyril Upham and Edwin Lamnke
worried that the recently created FDIC would favor its own interests over those of other
creditors. They concluded that "since [the FDIC] is a quasi-governmental body, it may be
expected to administer assets fairly with respect to the rights of all depositors." CYRIL B.
UPHAM & EDWIN LAmKE, CLOSED AND DISTRESSED BANKS: A STUDY IN PUnLIC
ADMINISTRATION 58 (1934). For doubts on this score, see infra Part IIIA.
104. See, e.g., EDWARD J. KANE, THE S&L INSURANCE MESS: How DID IT HAPPEN? 1
(1985) (arguing the problem rests in structural flaws of the system and that periodic review
is imperative); Arnoud W.A. Boot & Anjan V. Thakor, Self-Interested Bank Regulation, 83
Am. ECON. R~v. 206, 207-08 (1993) (focusing on bank rescue packages and on the behavior
of troubled banks in light of rescue offers); Skeel, supra note 18 (discussing initiation issues
proposing possible reforms).
105. Banks have a debt-equity ratio of about 9:1. See generally RISK MGMT. ASS'N,
THE ANNUAL STATEMENT STUDIES: FINANCIAL RATIO BENCHMARKS 2008-2009 (2008).
Nonbank firms in different industries tend to have much lower leverage ratios. Id. The
following are median debt-equity ratios for select industries in 2004-2005: Agriculture
(dairy cattle and milk production): 2:3; manufacturing (plastics): 1:4; mining (sand and
gravel): 1:4; and transportation (freight trucking): 2:6. Id
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initiates the bank resolution process as the bank nears insolvency. Rather, it
asks whether there are significant benefits from speed in resolving a failed
bank once a procedure has been initiated. We are skeptical of the possible
benefits of speed and conclude that speed does not justify giving the FDIC
control over the resolution process.
Speed provides two closely related benefits: liquidity and confidence in
the banking system. Speed gives depositors uninterrupted access to their
deposit balances, preserving liquidity.106  The assurance of continued
liquidity of deposits in turn increases depositors' confidence in the banking
system and prevents bank runs that could pose a risk to the entire financial
system. Although these benefits may be substantial, they do not require
FDIC control over the resolution process.
In resolving a failed bank, the resolving authority must dispose of the
bank's assets and distribute the proceeds to the bank's creditors. These tasks
are distinct from the FDIC's duty to honor its commitment to the insured
depositors. The EDI Act requires the FDIC to reimburse insured depositors
from the Deposit Insurance Fund ("DIE" or "insurance fuind")'07 to the
106. See FDIC, THE FIRST FIFTY YEARS: A HISTORY OF THE FDIC 1933-1983, at 83
(1984) ("[T]here were also conflicting concerns that depositors had to wait too long to
recover their funds."). One can question the importance of this liquidity. Depositors can
obtain liquid short-ternm funds by using credit cards or investing in money market funds
offered by mutual funds. They do not need the liquidity provided by demand deposits;
alternative products offering it are available. See Daniel R. Fischel, Andrew M. Rosenfield
& Robert S. Stillman, The Regulation of Banks and Bank Holding Companies, 73 VA. L.
REv. 301, 318 (1987) ("This delay in the ability to obtain access to funds has historically
been thought to be intolerable in the case of depositors ... its validity is questionable today
because depositors have available liquidity substitutes such as money market fuinds and
credit cards.'). For the rise of financial products issued by nonbanks that are functionally
similar to demand deposits, see Jonathan Macey & Geoffrey Miller, Nondeposits and the
Future of Banking Regulation, 91 MICH. L. REv. 237, 237 (1992).
107. For the history of the Federal Deposit Insurance Act, see Charles W. Calomiris &
Eugene N. White, The Origins of Deposit Insurance, in THE REGULATED ECONOMY: A
HISTORICAL APPROACH TO POLITICAL ECONOMY 145 (Claudia Goldin & Gary D. Libecap
eds., 1994). For the FDIC practice of allowing prompt access, see George G. Kaufman &
Steven A. Seelig, Post-Resolution Treatment of Depositors at Failed Banks: Implications
for the Severity of Banking Crises, Systemic Risk, and Too Big to Fail, 26 ECON. PERSP. 27,
32 (2002). For the FDIC's prompt payment of insured deposits when conducting a direct
payoff transaction, see George G. Kaufiman, Depositor Liquidity and Loss Sharing in Bank
Failure Resolutions, 22 CONTEMP. ECON. PoL'Y 237, 245 (2004). The United States is one
of the few countries that gives depositors immediate access to insured deposits. See
Kaufmnan & Seelig, supra, at 32-33, 36 (noting the countries in Table 1); George G.
Kaufman, Using Efficient Bank Insolvency Resolution to Solve the Deposit Insurance
Problem, 8 J. BANItING REG. 40, 46 (2006) (noting that FDIC usually pays insured deposits
on close of business day after seizure). For the timing in which select countries with deposit
insurance pay insured depositors, see GILLIAN G.H. GARCIA, DEPOSIT INSURANCE: ACTUAL
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insured limrit.' 08 Reimbursement of insured depositors does not therefore
depend on when or whether the failed bank's assets are liquidated, or the
liquidation value of those assets. Speedy satisfaction of insured depositors is
necessary to preserve the liquidity of their deposits. However, speed in
liquidating the failed bank's assets is unnecessary to do so. The FDIC can
simply pay the depositors directly or pay a bank to assume the liabilities. As
long as depositors have uninterrupted access to their insured deposits, they
should be indifferent as to the fate of their depository bank or its assets.
Insured depositors therefore have no reason to run on their failed banks. For
the same reason, the failure of unhealthy banks cannot justifiably induce
insured depositors of healthy banks to run on their banks as long as they
believe that the insurance fund is solvent and that they will retain access to
their deposits in the event of bank failure.
As insurer of the deposits, the FDIC must be subrogated to their rights
so that it can be reimbursed for the expense of making depositors whole.
However, the liquidation of the assets need not occur concurrently with the
payment of depositors. In fact, the FDIC often retains a sizable portion of the
failed bank's assets, by choice or necessity, and liquidates them over time.' 09
The FDIC sometimes does transfer assets to the acquiring bank as partial
compensation for the acquirer's assumption of insured deposits and other
liabilities. However, as noted above, the acquirer usually receives less than a
quarter of the failed bank's assets,"10 and the FDIC uses cash payments to
make up the difference between the deposits assumed and the assets received.
In other words, the FDIC must have a claim against the assets of a failed
bank, but it need not control the disposition of these assets.
FDIC control of assets might be justified if it reduced the size of the
FDIC's claim against the failed bank. For instance, consumers value
liquidity and the convenience provided by a bank account. Accordingly, the
FDIC can usually find an acquirer willing to assume the insured deposits for
less than the amount that it would cost the FDIC to repay the insured
depositors in full."' The FDIC's control of the physical assets of the failed
bank would be appropriate if consumer depositors were more likely to
continue their banking relationship with the acquiring bank if the acquiring
bank purchases some of these assets. In this case, acquirers of consumer
ANJD GOOD PRACTICES 83-84 (2000).
108. 12 U.S.C. §1821(a)(5) (2006).
109. Div. RESOLUTION & RECEIVERSHIPS, supra note 13, at 22.
110. Supra note 81 and accompanying text.
I111. The acquirer typically "pays" a premium for the deposits.
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deposits would typically prefer to purchase the failed bank's physical
assets.' 12 But the factual assumption is wrong: Acquirers do not typically
pick them up. Instead, the standard purchase and assumption agreement
merely gives the acquirer an option to purchase them." 3 This is not hard to
explain. Because acquiring banks have their own branches and other deposit
facilities, they (and their depositors) do not usually need the failed bank's
physical assets. Acquirers can preserve a consumer depositor's preexisting
banking relationship with her failed bank, if at all, without buying the failed
bank's furniture or equipment. In fact, throughout the 1 980s the assets sold
as a part of the basic purchase and assumption agreement were limited to
cash and cash equivalents."14 Acquirers are unlikely to pay more for deposits
merely because the FDIC offers the failed bank's physical assets as well. In
any case, physical assets account for a tiny fraction (an average of 2.29%) of
the assets of the failed banks.
It might be thought that uninsured depositors and subordinate creditors
prefer a quick liquidation of a failed bank's assets. Their willingness to
invest in banks would be jeopardized by delays in the recoupment of their
investments. If the FDIC's control of the resolution process speeds
resolution, it could increase the value of their claims."' This argument is
unconvincing. First, most uninsured depositors and other creditors withdraw
their deposits and are paid in full before a bank fails and thus do not suffer
the consequences of delay." 6  The behavior of foreign depositors in
112. A similar argument with regard to the bank's employees is weak. The acquirer
may wish to hire the employees of the failed bank to increase the chance that the bank's
depositors or borrowers will continue their relationship with the bank. However, the FDIC
need not control the resolution process to allow this to happen. These employees will
undoubtedly have at-will contracts with the failed bank and the acquiring bank is free to hire
them (or not). Moreover, coordinating the hiring of these employees is likely to be relatively
easy, as banks have few employees considering their asset size. Nearly 80% (86 of 109) of
the banks in our sample had fewer than one hundred employees.
113. See Purchase and Assumption Agreement Between FDIC and Wilshire State Bank,
17 (June 26, 2009), available at http://www.fdic.gov/bank/individual/failed/mirae_
P and A.pdf (last visited Sept. 28, 2010) (providing a standard purchase option) (on file
w~ith the Washington and Lee Law Review).
114. See Eric Bloecher & John F. Bovenzi, Evolution of the FDIC's Resolution
Practices, in MANAGING THE Cisis: THE FDIC AND RTC EXPERIENCE 65, 67 (1998)
("[Blecause only 'clean' assets, such as cash and cash equivalents, were passed, due
diligence was not required by bidders.").
115. This assumes that the amount received in the sale remains the same. If the market
for the failed bank's assets are not liquid, a quick sale could reduce the liquidation value.
116. See Christine M. Bradley & Lynn Shibut, The Liability Structure of FDIC-Insured
Institutions: Changes and Implications, 18:2 FDIC BANKING REv. 1, 20 (2006) ("[Mlost
uninsured depositors do not lose money when a bank fails because they manage to withdraw
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Continental Illinois Bank and Trust's failure illustrates the behavior.
Deposits in foreign offices are not "deposits" under the FDI Act, and they are
therefore uninsured and junior in priority to deposits in domestic offce."
Foreign depositors exited the bank in droves before it failed. 18 Most
uninsured depositors therefore are unconcerned about the liquidation value of
their claims against a failed bank because they will not have claims when the
bank fails.
Uninsured depositors and other creditors who remain and are concerned
about a bank's continued solvency can and do take security interests in the
bank's assets.119 Applicable law sometimes requires certain depositors and
lenders to do so in any case. 120 Collateral makes uninsured secured creditors
generally indifferent to the speed at which the failed bank is resolved because
they are almost certain to recover in full. To the extent that they are
concerned, there is no reason why they must wait until all of the assets are
sold. Uninsured depositors could sell their claims to those who are more
patient; by definition uninsured deposits are for substantial amounts.
Alternatively, the resolution process could allow partial compensation of the
their deposits and receive full payment beforehand."); James A. Marino & Rosalind L.
Bennett, The Consequences of National Depositor Preference, 12:2 FDIC BANKING REV. 19,
28-30 (1999) (noting that unprotected depositor and creditor claims are typically small at the
time of failure); John S. Jordan, Depositor Discipline at Failing Banks, NEW ENGLAND
ECON. REV., MAR.-APR. 2000 at 15 (noting that 70% of uninsured deposits in a sample of
failed banks were withdrawn within two years of failure); see also A.M. Davenport & K.M.
McDill, The Depositor Behind the Discipline: A Micro-Level Case Study of Hamilton Bank,
30 J. FIN. SERVICES RES., Aug. 2006, at 93 (providing evidence that uninsured depositors
respond to the financial health of banks).
117. See 12 U.S.C § 18 13(m) (2006) (defining an insured deposit).
118. See Kate McDermott, Continental Illinois National Bank and Trust Company, in
MANAGING THE CRISIS: THE FDIC AND RTC EXPERIENCE 545, 547 (1998) ("Large foreign
depositors became nervous after hearing rumors of Continental's imminent failure, and, in
May 1984, began a high-speed electronic deposit run on the bank.").
119. See James B. Thomson, The National Depositor Preference Law, ECON.
COMMENT., FED. RES. BANK CLEVELAND, Feb. 15, 1994 (examining depositor preference);
Eric Hirschhorn & David Zervos, Policies to Change the Priority of Claimants: The Case of
Depositor Preference Laws, 4 J. FIN. SERVICES RES. 1 11, 111-15 (1990) (discussing how
depositor preference rules impact the creditors).
120. FHLB advances require collateralization, as do deposits of public fuinds in most
jurisdictions. See, e.g., COLO. REV. STAT. § 11-10.5-107(5) (2009) ("As an ongoing
requirement of designation as an eligible public depository, any such depository shall pledge
collateral having a market value in excess of one hundred two percent of the aggregate
uninsured public deposits."); OR. REV. STAT. § 295.008(2)(b) (2009) (noting conditions for
acting as a custodian or bank depository); VA. CODE ANN. § 2.2-4402 (2009) ("Every
qualified public depository shall deposit with the State Treasurer. ... eligible collateral equal
to or in excess of the required collateral of such depository to be held subject to the order of
the Treasury Board.").
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uninsured depositors in advance of the completion of the process. In fact, in
the past the FDIC has made advance payments to uninsured depositors,'12'
although it has since discontinued the practice.12 2 There is even less reason to
rush on behalf of the nondepositors. As discussed more thoroughly in
Section Ill.B.2 below, failed banks almost always have insufficient assets to
repay the FDIC and uninsured depositors in full.22' Because they are junior
to depositors in priority, nondepositors receive nothing. They therefore
should not care about the speed at which a failed bank is resolved.
Perhaps the greatest weakness with the speed of liquidation argument is
that the FDIC does not, in fact, quickly liquidate the assets of the failed bank.
The FDIC's own resolution manual proposes a four-year liquidation
schedule,12 4 and the average time elapsed between the seizure of failed banks
between 2002 and 2003 and the date of the last distribution to depositors was
forty-seven months. In only one transaction was the final payment made in
less than one year (ten months).
B. The FDIC as Residual Claimant
In some bankruptcies, such as most single-asset real estate cases, one
creditor is owed much more than any other. While bankruptcy does apply
some special rules in the single-asset real estate context,12 5 it does not assign
total control over the process to the largest creditor. It does not do so because
of the fear that the largest creditor will sell the real estate too quickly and for
too little at the expense of junior Claimants. 2
121. See S. Blair Bean, Treatment of Uninsured Depositors and Other Receivership
Creditors, in MANAGING THE Cpisis: THE FDIC AND RTC EXPERIENCE 245, 250 (1998) ("If
the FDIC's actual collections on the assets of the failed institutions exceeded the advance
payments and administrative expenses of the receivership, the uninsured depositors and
other creditors received additional payments on their claims.").
122. See George G. Kaufmnan, Depositor Liquidity and Loss Sharing in Bank Failure
Resolutions, 22 CONTEMP. ECON. POL'Y 23 7, 245 (2004) (noting the FDIC's prompt payment
of insured deposits when conducting a direct payoff transaction).
123. See infra notes 125-28 and accompanying text (discussing the role of the FDIC as
a residual claimant in bank failures).
124. See supra note 13 and accompanying text (p~roviding a timeline for the disposition
of a failed bank's assets).
125. See, e.g., I11 U.S.C. § 362(d)(3) (2006) (governing the stay of an act against single
asset real estate).
126. Bankruptcy law also grants minority creditors protection against dominant
creditors who share the same priority. Within each class, approval of a plan of
reorganization requires the vote of two-thirds of the value of claims and the majority of
claims. Id. § 1126(c). As a result, a creditor that is owed 99% of the debt of the debtor may
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The law can, however, entrust the largest creditor with control over the
process if it is also the residual claimant: A claimant that receives all of the
gains associated with a good decision and all of the losses associated with a
bad decision. A creditor is the residual claimant if two conditions are
satisfied: i) those who have equal priority with the creditor have negligible
claims or the creditor is fully compensated for the costs it incurs in
maximizing the value of assets, and ii) regardless of the decisions made by
the creditor, those senior to the creditor in priority will be paid in full and
those junior to the creditor will not be paid anything. In most nonbank
insolvencies there is no claimant who fully meets each criteria and the law
must allocate control among the parties who bear at least some of the risk
associated with the decision.
Consider what happens when the decision-maker is not the residual
claimant. Take the first condition. Assume that a firm has two creditors of
equal priority and each are owed $50. Assume that the firm's assets can be
sold for $80 if the decision-maker incurs a cost of $15. If this cost is not
incurred, the firm can only be sold for $60. It is socially efficient for the
decision-maker to incur this cost, because the sale nets $5 more if the
decision maker incurs the cost ($80-4i54565) than if she does not incur it
($60-0460). However, she will not incur the cost unless she is reimbursed.
If the decision maker does not incur the cost, she will receive $30 (half of
$60). If she incurs it, she will receive a net of $25 ($40-415). This problem
can be eliminated by allowing the decision-maker to recoup her
administrative costs before dividing the proceeds with the other creditor, but
this can create its own problems. If the decision-maker derives some private
benefit from these expenses (perhaps she can overstate her expenses), she can
use this priority to divert value from the other creditor. However, her ability
to do so declines as the proportion of the debt owed to the decision-maker
increases.
Now consider the second assumption. Assume that a firm again has two
creditors that are owed $50, but now also assume that one is senior to the
other. Suppose the decision-maker has three options. If she adopts plan A,
there is a 90% chance that the firm's assets will be sold for a present value of
$70 and a 10% chance that they will be sold for a present value of $20. If she
adopts Plan B, there is a 50% chance that the firm's assets will be sold for a
present value of $90 and a 50% chance that they will be sold for a present
value of $20. Plan C would be to sell the firm's assets for $60 with certainty.
be unable to approve a plan of reorganization if there were multiple smaller creditors and
they opposed the plan.
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Plan A is clearly the socially optimal choice as its expected present value of
$65 exceeds that of Plan B ($55) and Plan C ($60). However, if the decision-
maker holds the junior claim, she will prefer Plan B as this will provide her
with an expected payment of $20 which is more than what she will expect to
receive from Plan A ($18) or Plan C ($10). If the decision-maker holds the
senior claim, she still does not have the right incentives. The senior claimant
will prefer Plan C as this provides her with an expected payment of $50
which is more than what she would receive from Plan A ($47) or Plan B
($35)127 There is no true residual claimant in this hypothetical. Note that
this problem is not inevitable in the presence of senior and junior claimants; it
disappears if we change the value of the claims. Assume, for example, that
the senior claim is owed just $20 and the junior claim is owed $80. The
senior claim will be paid in full regardless of the plan chosen. The junior
claim bears all of the risk (it is the residual claimant) and would choose the
plan (Plan A) that maximizes social welfare. Similarly, if we assume that the
senior claimant is owed $90 and that the junior claimant is owed $ 10, then
the junior claimant will receive nothing regardless of the plan adopted. The
senior claimant bears all of the risk and would make the choice that
maximizes social welfare.
Allocating decision-making authority to the residual claimant is
generally defensible. However, to supply ex ante efficient incentives, an
exception may occasionally justify' giving decisions to a junior claimant. The
residual claimant has an incentive to make ex. post socially optimal choices,
because it benefits from doing so. But it might be insufficiently motivated to
make decisions at earlier stages that avoid financial risk later on. Additional
motivation is provided by taking decisions away from the residual claimant
and giving them to junior claimants when the firm is in financial distress.
Because junior claimants lack the incentive to make decisions to benefit
residual claimants, the shift in decision making potentially harms residual
claimants' interests. For this reason, residual claimants have a farther
incentive to remain in control of the firm's fortunes. To remain in control,
they must make decisions that avoid putting the firm into financial distress.
An ex post inefficient allocation of decision making is required to give
residual claimants ex ante efficient incentives.
Assume, for example, that the senior secured creditors are the residual
claimants of a failed firm and that allocating decision-making rights to
127. These examples ignore the possibility of Coaseian bargaining. For example, the
junior claimant in this scenario could simply repay the senior claimant in full and thereby
obtain the right to make the decisions.
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unsecured creditors would result in a social loss (and a loss to the senior
secured claimant) of $30. While this creates an ex post cost, it may
provide ex ante incentives for the senior secured lender to curb excessive
risk taking by the debtor. Assume that one year before insolvency the
firm could have sold its assets for $100 and that the only debt was $50
owed to the senior secured creditor. Finally, assume that the debtor also
had the choice of engaging in a project that, if successful, would have
been worth $200. However, the project would fail half of the time, and if
it did so the firm's assets would be worth just $50 and the firm would
incur tort claims of $100. Society would not want the firm to undertake
this project. The expected value of the project is $75 ((.5 x $200) + (.5 x -
$50) =$75), while liquidation of the firm would net $50 for the unsecured
creditors ($1l00-$50). However, the project would make the shareholders
better off, on average, than if the firm were liquidated. If the firm were
liquidated, shareholders receive nothing. For their part, the senior secured
lender would have no reason to stop the shareholders from pursuing the
project because its priority guarantees it payment in full ($50) whether the
project is undertaken or the firm liquidated. Note that the lender would
oppose the project if either it shared control upon insolvency (and thus
$30 was wasted) or if it were subordinated to the tort victims. Imposing
the ex post cost is a way to avoid the inefficiencies caused by the tort
claimant's lack of priority and ability to control the debtor's investment
decisions. The exception that separates decision making and residual
claimants is inapplicable in bank failures. As we show below, there are
very few fixed claimants that are junior to the FDIC; general creditors and
subordinated creditors do not account for a meaningful component of the
capital structure of failed banks.'1
28
Two pieces of evidence suggest that the FDIC is truly the residual
claimant in the overwhelming majority of bank insolvencies. First, in
Section III.B.l we show that the FDIC accounts for the vast majority of
claims on the assets of both healthy and failed banks. The FDIC's status
as the holder of the overwhelming majority of the debt does not ensure
that it will be the residual claimant. Whether the majority creditor is a
residual claimant depends on the value of the assets available for
distribution to creditors. However, the greater the share of debt held by a
creditor and the greater the value of the debt relative to the equity, the
greater is the chance that the majority creditor will be the residual
claimant too. For example, consider a bank with $10 in senior secured
128. InfralTablel1.
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claims, $80 in insured deposits, and $10 in general unsecured claims.
Because the secured claims will have priority over the deposits and the
deposits will have priority over the general claims, the FDIC will be the
residual claimant as long as the plausible range of asset values is between
$10 and $90. If assets have a $90 value, the FDIC (subrogated to the
rights of insured depositors) is repaid in full ($90-$ 10=$80). The FDIC
receives nothing if assets have a value of $10 or less ($10-$1040). The
FDIC is repaid in part if asset values are between $11 ($11-Si04$1) and
$89 ($89-S$10= $79).
Second, we examine the actual payouts from failed banks in Section
III.B.2. We show three patterns in these payouts: i) the most important
secured creditors have recovered in full in every bank failure to date;
ii) the FDIC suffered significant losses in the vast majority of bank
failures; and iii) general creditors almost never receive any dividends. As
a result, it is the FDIC that would enjoy the gains from a distribution
method that yields greater proceeds.
1. The FDIC as the Largest Creditor
Most banks are part of holding company structures. However, with
the possible exception of the very largest banks, discussed below, the
capital structures of the actual banks are extremely simple. Domestic
deposits account for the overwhelming majority of bank liabilities, and
almost all of these domestic deposits are insured. These banks have
comparatively little general unsecured debt and almost no subordinated
debt. This is true whether we examine failed banks or banks more
generally.
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Table 1: Liability Structure of Failed Banks: 1/1/1995-5/31/2009
Less than $100 $500 $1 billion More than $5
$100 million to million to to $5 billion
million $500 $1 billion billion
million_______
Banks 44 45 10 15 5
Deposits as Percent 96.25% 92.85% 89.13% 87.35% 70.39%
of Liabilities
(Std. Dev.) (4.61%) (7.33%) (5.38%) (10.16%), (7.73%)
Percent of Deposits 89.8 1% 80.75% 66.03% 8 1.01% 84.35%
Insured
(Std. Dev.) (10.47%) (1.3)(23.37%) (16.93%) (6.15%)
Foreign Deposits as 0.00% 0.35% 0.00% 0.35% 0.00%
Percent of
Liabilities
(Std. Dev.) (0.00%) (1.62%) (0.00%) (1.35%) (0.00%)
FIILB as Percent of 1.43% 3.94% 8.82% 7.04% 26.10%
Liabilities
(Std. Dev.) (3.550/) (5.73%) (5.62%) (9.95%) (7.91%)
Repurchase 0.35% 1.21% 0.49% 3.47% 0.12%
obligations as % of
Liabilities
(Std. Dev.) (1.12%) (3.26%) (0.93%) (6.60%) (0.17%)
Subordinated debt 0.07% 0.00% 0.15% 0.18% 0.62%
as Percent of
Liabilities
(Std. Dev.) (0.30%) (0.00%) (0.43%) (0.38%) (1.22%)
General Unsecured 1.73% 2.01% 1.41% 2.20% 2.77%
Claims as Percent
of Liabilities
(Std. Dev.) (2.59%) (3.48%) (1.32%) (2.36%) (4.00%)
Table 1 documents key characteristics of the liability structure of failed
banks as of the last reporting period before their failures. For now we will
ignore the very largest banks-those with assets greater than five billion
dollars. In all other banks, deposits account for the overwhelming majority of
liabilities. The proportion declines somewhat according to the size of bank,
but remains high. Deposits constitute 96% of liabilities in failed bank with
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assets below $100 million.129 The percentages for banks with assets between
$100 and $500 million, $500 million and $1 billion, and $1 billion and $5
billion are 93%, 89%, and 87%, respectively. Out of the 120 banks that
failed between January 1, 1995 and May 31, 2009, only ten had deposits that
constituted less than 80% of liabilities.130  Healthy banks have a similarly
high percentage of deposits.'
The FDIC is only subrogated to the insured deposits, but Table 1 reveals
that a strong majority of deposits are insured. The percentage of insured
deposits at healthy banks is a little lower.132 Table 1 presents data from the
last Call Report issued before the bank's failure, and uninsured deposits are
likely to decline further as the bank nears insolvency. If the resolution
process is not yet complete, the FDIC reports the claims of uninsured
depositors when the acquiring bank assumes only the insured deposits. In the
sixteen transactions for which we could find data, uninsured depositors
averaged just 4.75% of total deposits. Uninsured depositors typically either
exit before a bank fails or convert their uninsured amounts to insured
deposits. The bank replaces the exited funds with another funding source.
For instance, a study of failed New England banks found that they lost about
70% of their uninsured deposits within two years of failure.33' The banks,
however, replaced these deposits with insured deposits. Such replacement
allows the banks to retain the same source of funding while increasing the
percentage of insured deposits. In addition, failed banks tend to overstate the
amount of uninsured deposits, thereby understating insured deposits. 114 By
129. Asset values of banks are adjusted for inflation.
130. The predominance of deposit liabilities has not changed much over time. Table 1
would not change materially if we focused only on banks that failed between 2008-2009.
131. See FDIC, Statistics on Depository Institutions Report, http://www2.fdic.
gov/sdilmain.asp (last visited Sept. 28, 2010) (revealing that as of Dec. 31, 2008 deposits
approximately 83% of liabilities for banks with assets up to $100 million, 90% for banks
with assets between $100 million and $1 billion, and 73% for banks with $1 billion or more
in assets) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review).
132. See id. (revealing that as of Mar. 31, 2009, approximately 78% of deposits are
insured at banks with up to $ 100 million in assets, 71 % at banks with between $ 100 million
and $500 million in assets, and 59% at banks with more than $1 billion in assets).
133. See John S. Jordan, Depositor Discipline at Failing Banks, NEW ENGLAND EcoN.
REV., Mar.-Apr. 2000, at 15, 16 ("[Flailing banks in New England experienced a 70 percent
decline in their uninsured deposits in their final two years of operation."); Matthew T. Billett
et al., The Cost of Market Versus Regulatory Discipline in Banking, 48 J. FIN. EcON. 333,
333 (1998) (finding that banks increase their proportion of insured deposits in response to a
ratings downgrade).
134. See AN.DREW M. DAVENPORT ET AL., AN EVALUATION OF THE DENOMINATOR OF
THE RESERVE RATio: FDIC STAFF STUDY 16 (2007), available at http://www.fdic.gov-
depositlinsurance/initiative/DenominatorBoard.pdf (examining a sample of failed banks to
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contrast, healthy banks, which do not experience a run on uninsured deposits,
retain higher percentages of uninsured deposits.
Uninsured domestic deposits are equal in priority to the insured claims
to which the FDIC is subrogated. Other claims are either senior or junior to
the FDIC, but these claims are rarely significant. General claims rarely
account for more than 5% of a bank's assets. 13 ' Foreign deposits are junior to
the FDIC's claims,13 6 but just three banks in our sample had any foreign
deposits, and none had foreign deposits that accounted for more than 10% of
all deposits. With the possible exception of the very largest banks, discussed
below, this is true of healthy banks as well. 137 Small banks generally do not
have foreign branches.
The comparative absence of subordinated debt among failed banks
deserves notice.138 Subordinated debt represents only 1% of total liabilities
among every category of bank, and is literally nonexistent in failed banks
with less than $500 million in assets. The pattern is consistent with the
issuance of subordinated debt by U.S. commercial banks generally. In the
1990s, the percent of banks issuing subordinated debt declined for banks of
all sizes except for the very largest banks.139 Subordinated debt was present
on the balance sheets of almost all of the largest banks in 1998.140 This trend
continues. One study found that only 9% of banks sampled between 1996
and 2005 issued any subordinated debt, and nearly two-thirds of these banks
reveal an understatement in final Call Reports).
135. We estimate general claims as the sum of "Trading Liabilities," "Other Borrowed
Liabilities" and "Other Liabilities" less "FHLB Advances."
136. See 12 U.S.C. § 182 l(d)(l l)(A)(2006) (espousing the priority for liquidation
disbursements); id § 1813(1) (defining the term "deposit").
137. See supra note 25 and accompanying text (displaying the liability structure of
failed banks).
138. As discussed in Part IV, subordinated debt is more conmmon at the holding
company level. About 80% of U.S. banks and almost all banks with assets of at least one
billion dollars are owned by holding companies. See FEDERAL RESERVE SYSTEM STUDY
GROUP ON SUBORDINATED NOTES AND DEBENTURES, STAFF STUDY 172: USING
SUBORDINATED DEBT AS AN INSTRUMENT OF MARKET DISCIPLINE at 26 (1999) (displaying the
subordinated debt issuance by insured commercial banks from 1991-98). About 10% of
these holding companies issue subordinated debt with the issuers concentrated among the
very largest holding companies. Id at 26. The percentage of bank holding companies
issuing such debt has declined for every size bank holding company other than large
companies (although the amounts have increased). Id. In any case, our story is about the
capital structure of the bank, not the bank holding company. The FDIC resolves failed
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were large banks with assets exceeding 1 billion dollars.14'1 Thus,
subordinated debt is as relatively rare in healthy banks as it is in failed
banks.14 2 The liability structure of healthy banks is similar in these respects
to'that of failed banks. Failed banks in all asset size categories show little
debt owed to general creditors and almost no subordinated debt.
Secured claims are senior to the FDIC, and some domestic deposits are
secured by the bank's securities or mortgages. 14 3 Federal Home Loan Bank
advances are the most important type of secured liability for many banks.'"4
These advances must be at least fully collateralized by securities. 4
Although many failed banks have not taken such advances, Federal Home
Loan Bank advances are significant liabilities for banks which have taken
them. Table 1 shows that Federal Home Loan liabilities rise with bank size
from about 1.4% for the smallest banks to almost 10% for banks between one
and five billion and over 26% for banks over five billion. We note that the
importance of FHLB loans may be due in part to the real estate boom of the
first decade of the twenty-first century. In sum, Table 1 shows that failed
banks other than mega-banks have a comparatively simple liability structure.
As banks near failure, most of their liabilities are domestic deposits, and the
overwhelming majority of failed banks have no significant foreign deposits,
general unsecured claims or subordinated debt. A few banks do have some
141. See A. Sinan Cebenoyan & Fatma Cebenoyan, Subordinated Debt, Uninsured
Deposits, and Market Discipline. Evidence from US. Bank Holding Companies 1, 17
(Hunter College Dept. of Econ. Working Papers, Paper No. 421, July 2007) (providing
statistical information regarding the issuance of subordinated debt).
142. See Douglas D. Evanoff & Larry D. Wall, Subordinated Debt and Bank Capital
Reform 13, 39 (Fed. Res. Bank of Chicago Working Papers, Paper No. 2000-24, 2000)
(noting the frequency with which banks issue subordinated debt).
143. State statutes often require deposits by state and political subdivisions to be
collateralized. A random sample of failed banks by asset size reveals that these "preferred
deposits" range between 0% and 3% of a bank's deposit liabilities. Such collateralization
therefore represents a relatively unimportant sort of security interest.
144. See Rosalind L. Bennett et al., Should the FDIC Worry About the FHLB? The
Impact of Federal Home Loan Bank Advances on the Bank Insurance Fund 29 (Fed. Res.
Bank of Richmond, Working Paper No. 05-05, 2005) (stating that FHLB advances account
for close to half of secured fuinding at U.S. banks as of 2003, amounting to almost 3% of
total bank assets).
145. See 12 U.S.C. § 1430(a)(3) (2006) ("A Bank, at the time of origination or renewal
of a loan or advance, shall obtain and maintain a security interest in collateral. . .. ").
Federal funds and repurchase agreements are also an important type of secured liabilities.
See Lynn Shibut, Should Bank Liability Structure Influence Deposit Insurance Pricing? 14
(FDIC, Working Paper No. 2002-01, 2002) ("The most prevalent types of secured credits
include FHLB advances, repurchase agreements, public deposits and borrowings from
Federal Reserve Bank (FRB) discount window.').
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Federal Home Loan Bank advances or other secured debt, but these secured
claims rarely account for more than 25% of all liabilities. Some banks do
have significant amounts of uninsured deposits (at least at the time of the last
call report before failure), and these depositors will have a claim on the assets
separate from the FDIC. However, the FDIC will share proceeds on a pari-
passu basis with these creditors, and so they can generally trust the FDIC to
maximize recovery as long as the FDIC is appropriately compensated for its
expenses and is trying to minimize the loss to the insurance fund.
2. FDIC Losses on Failure
Section III.B. 1 demonstrates that insured deposits account for the
overwhelming majority of the liabilities of insolvent banks. It also
demonstrates that most of the remaining liabilities will be senior to the
FDIC's claim on the failed firm's assets (FHLB loans) or will share in the
proceeds on a pari-passu basis (uninsured deposits). The senior secured
liabilities should not disturb the FDIC's status as residual claimant because
they are always paid in full; there has never been a default on an FHLB
loan. 146  The uninsured deposits should not disturb the FDIC's status as
residual claimant because most uninsured deposits will flee as the bank nears
insolvency and the remaining will share in the proceeds on a pari-passu basis.
The presence of a large amount of claims junior to the FDIC could distort the
FDIC's incentives, but these claims (foreign deposits, general unsecured
claims and subordinated debt) are practically nonexistent in nearly all bank
failures. Moreover, these claims rarely receive any payment. Of the fifty-
one receiverships begun between 1995 and 2008 for which the FDIC reports
the percentage distribution to general claimants, general claimants have
received nothing in forty-nine.1
4 7
146. See Mark J. Flannery & W. Scott Frame, The Federal Home Loan Bank System:
The "Other" Housing GSE, 91 FED. REs. BAN'K OF ATLANTA, EcON. REv. 33, 39 (2006) ("No
FHLB has ever suffered a credit loss on an advance.").
147. General claimants received 28% of their claims in the failure of Net First National
Bank and 100% of their claims in the failure of Dollar Savings Bank. The distribution to
general creditors is only available for receiverships that are incomplete. It is therefore
possible that general creditors could receive distributions in more of these receiverships.
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Even if the FDIC were the sole creditor of the bank, it still would not be
the residual claimant if the value of the assets exceeded the value of the
bank's liabilities. i theory, a bank with a solvent balance sheet could fail if
its regulator mistakenly declared the bank insolvent and seized it or if a
liquidity shock rendered the bank unable to meet short term obligations and
unable to issue new shares to raise new funds. In practice, however, a failed
bank's assets almost never exceed its liabilities: the FDIC almost always
loses significant amounts of money. As long as the FDIC is losing money, it
has the proper incentive to maximize the amount recovered, as the FDIC will
receive each additional dollar raised. 14 ' Figure 2 shows the frequency with
148. Strictly, the FDIC has an incentive to maximize amounts recovered when its
distribution of amounts recovered exceeds the cost to it of the recovery. The FDIC's
distribution is limited because the amounts recovered must be shared with uninsured
domestic depositors. See 12 U.S.C. § 182 l(d)(1 l)(A)(ii) (noting depositor ordering
preference). Because it incurs costs in recovering assets, the FDIC's incentive therefore is to
maximize net returns to it, not total returns. The qualification usually is unimportant. There
are relatively few uninsured depositors of failed banks. See supra Table I (displaying the
liability structure of failed banks). Applicable rules give priority to the expenses the FDIC
incurs in disposing of assets over depositor claims. As a result, it retains the incentive to
maximize the value of the assets.
The FDIC may not want to sell the failed bank's assets for their greatest value if doing
so would jeopardize the financial stability of the acquiring bank and the acquirer is also
FDIC- insured. Instead, given some assumptions about liquidity, the FDIC may wish to use
the sale to subsidize the acquiring bank. We are unconcerned about this theoretical
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which FDIC losses (expressed as a percentage of deposits)149 fall into various
categories. Note that the FDIC's loss rate is typically very high-more than
half (5 6%) of bank failures resulted in FDIC losses exceeding twenty-percent
of total deposits. The loss rate is less than 5% in just 14% of transactions.
The FDIC's status as a residual claimant justifies its control over the
resolution process. We do not claim that Congress gave the FDIC control
over the resolution process because the FDIC is the residual claimant on most
failed banks' assets. This historical claim is false. Instead, the FDIC's status
as a residual claimant in control of bank resolutions likely was an unintended
consequence of Congress's grant of liquidation powers to the FDIC.
Congress created a federal receiver with powers to liquidate failed banks and
gave the FDIC these powers. Federal deposit insurance, along with the right
of subrogation to insured depositors, in turn made the FDIC the residual
claimant in most banks being liquidated. But Congress did not give the FDIC
liquidation powers because it was the residual claimant. The drafting history
of the legislation creating the FDIC and federal deposit insurance supports
this conclusion.
The Banking Act of 1933 established both the FDIC and deposit
insurance. The year before the Act was enacted, Senator Carter Glass, one of
its architects, introduced in the Senate Banking and Currency Committee a
proposed banking bill. The bill created a "Federal Liquidating
possibility for three reasons. First, the possibility is not realistic. The FDIC requires bidders
of failed banks to meet capital and managerial requirements. An acquirer whose acquisition
would put it in financial jeopardy is not a qualified bidder. Second, under the least-cost
resolution standard binding on the FDIC, the FDIC arguably lacks the legal authority to
make the sale proposed. Section 1823(a)(4)(ii) prohibits the FDIC from making
expenditures or incurring obligations with respect to the failed bank unless doing so has the
least cost to the deposit insurance fund among available alternatives. 12 U.S.C.
§ I 823(a)(4)(ii). Selling assets of an insolvent bank to an acquirer at below value increases
the loss to the failed bank's creditors, including the bank's insured depositors. Because the
FDIC must pay insured deposits from the deposit insurance fund, the increased loss from a
below-value sale is bomne by the deposit insurance fund. The alternative of selling assets at
value makes a sale at value a less costly alternative than a below-value sale. The least-cost
resolution standard therefore bars below-value sales. Third, if the FDIC is truly the residual
claimant of the failed bank (as the data we present suggest it almost always is), the failure to
maximize asset values comes at the expense of the deposit insurance fund. It would not
harm other creditors of the failed bank. Thus, even if the FDIC has the legal authority to
subsidize the acquiring bank, it will sell assets below value only if doing so is socially
efficient.
149. The literature often presents FDIC losses as a percentage of bank assets. We
choose instead to present them as a percentage of deposits because the FDIC does not insure
the bank's assets directly. Thus, losses divided by deposits (or insured deposits) give a more
accurate sense of the rate of loss. We use deposits instead of insured deposits because it is
hard to estimate insured deposits reliably.
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Corporation."' 50 Glass's bill gave the Corporation the power to liquidate
failed banks by purchasing their assets for the purpose of speeding up
payments to depositors.'5 ' The corporation in turn would sell the assets and
remit the sale proceeds to the bank's receiver. The receiver in turn would
distribute them to depositors. As proposed, the liquidation corporation would
control the failed bank's assets; depositors would be repaid from the sum the
corporation received for the assets. Glass's bill did not propose to insure
deposits. Depositors therefore would retain the risk of the bank's failure.
They suffered loss for amounts above their proportionate share of the failed
bank's assets. The Federal Liquidating Corporation's role simply was to
quicken receipt of available distributions to depositors. Because the
corporation did not insure deposits, it had no claim (derivative or original) on
the failed bank's assets.
Carter's bill failed over objections principally to the capitalization of the
proposed liquidating corporation! 12  However, it became the template the
Roosevelt administration and Congress used in drafting the Banking Act of
1933.'~ This meant that the Banking Act in its initial draft form gave the
power to liquidate failed national banks to a single resolution authority. Prior
law gave the Comptroller of the Currency the authority to appoint a receiver
for failed national banks. By 1932 most states had given their bank
150. See U.S. Senate, Banking and Currency Committee, 71st Cong., Section 10
(1932), reproduced in Federal Reserve Board's Comments and Recommendations on the
Glass Bill (S. 4115), 18 Fed. Res. Bull. 206, 211 (1932). See generally Draft of S.33 15,
Section 9, Carter Glass Papers, Alderman Library, Special Collections, University of
Virginia, Box 284.
151. See RIXEY SMITH & NORMAN BEASLEY, CARTER GLASS: A BIOGRAPHY 305-06
(1st ed. 1939) (describing the bill proposed by Glass); H. PARKER WILLIS & JOHN M.
CHAPMAN, THE BANKING SITUATION: AMERICAN POST-WAR PROBLEMS AND DEVELOPMENTS
65-66 (1 st ed. 1934) (same).
152. See Federal Reserve Board's Comments and Recommendations on the Glass Bill
(. 4115), 18 Fed. Res. Bull. 206, 211-25 (1932) (containing evaluations of Federal Reserve
Board and Federal Advisory Council).
153. See SMITH & BEASLEY, supra note 151, at 65-66 (describing the adoption of the
Banking Act of 1933). Roosevelt found Carter's proposed Federal Liquidating Corporation
attractive. Although Roosevelt initially wanted the Corporation to resolve failed banks by
recapitalizing them, he apparently agreed that the Corporation's role in resolution should be
limited to liquidation. H. Parker Willis, who helped Glass produce the 1932 bill, reported to
Glass his meeting with Roosevelt: 'I explained to him the liquidating provision of the Glass
bill and contrasted it with those of the bill proposed by the Comptroller of the Currency and
he said that he preferred greatly the Glass provisions because they eliminated the costly,
long-drawn receiverships, to which he said he had always felt a strong opposition." Letter of
H. Parker Willis to Carter Glass, Nov. 19, 1932, Carter Glass Papers, Alderman Library,
Special Collections, University of Virginia, Box 274.
1024
WHY BA NKS ARE NOTALLO WED IN BANKRUPTCY 12
superintendents the same powers.'5 The 1933 Act created a resolution
authority with the power to liquidate assets of member banks of the Federal
Reserve. This gave it powers lacking in a few states and enabled the
accumulation of expertise in liquidation through more concentrated control of
the resolution process. More significant was the status of the receiver in the
Act's initial draft form.' 55 Because Glass's bill did not provide for deposit
insurance, the receivership authority under the Act also would have no
interest in the assets of banks it was liquidating. This changed in the bill
Glass reintroduced in Congress.' 56 As part of the compromise needed to pass
the Banking Act, the Act created federal deposit insurance, and the FDIC
established federal deposit insurance. It also gave to the FDIC the power
already described in the Act to a liquidating corporation to dispose of assets
of any failed FDIC-member bank.'157 The Banking Act required the FDIC to
pay off insured depositors by creating a temporary national bank, to which
insured deposits were transferred. 58 Subrogated to the rights of insured
depositors, the FDIC now had an interest in the assets it was liquidating. In
the draft bill that developed into the Banking Act, the receivership authority
was defined first. Only later was the FDIC created and given that authority.
There is no evidence that the FDIC was given the authority because it had an
interest in the assets it would be liquidating.
IV. Limits of the Case for FDIC Contfrol
Section III argues that the FDIC is likely the residual claimant in nearly
all bank failures. It concludes that the FDIC therefore should have the
control of the resolution process bank insolvency law currently gives it.
Section Ul's case for FDIC control depends on at least four assumptions that
might not always hold. One assumption is that the capital structure of the
failed banks is not a direct result of the fact that the FDIC controls the
154. See UPHAm & LAmKE, supra note 103, at 35-38 ("In 1933 nearly all of the states
had adopted the federal rule and had given the state bank supervisor control over closed
bank liquidations.").
155. 77 Cong. Rec. 196 (1933); see S.245, 73d Cong. § 7 (1933) (discussing the
proposed Act).
156. See 77 Cong. Rec. 3109 (1933) (reintroducing the bank bill through major
modifications to the bank bill introduced previously).
157. See Banking Act of 1933, Pub L. No. 73-66, § 8(1), 48 Stat. 162, 172-74 ("It shall
be the duty of the Corporation to realize upon the assets of such closed bank . . . .)
158. See id. at 173-74 (outlining the process for paying off insured depositors of a
failed bank).
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resolution of failed banks. However, the resolution process should, in theory,
affect the capital structure firms adopt.5 9 If, for example, investors expect
the FDIC to exercise its resolution powers in a way that harms subordinated
debt or general claims (perhaps selling the bank's assets too quickly and too
cheaply), investors will be reluctant to purchase this debt and the firm will
rely more heavily on deposits or equity financing. Because a firm's capital
structure is endogenous, we cannot claim that the current resolution system is
truly optimal because we cannot directly assess the alternatives. We claim
only that our current resolution system appears well-suited to the capital
structure that firms have in fact chosen.
A second assumption is the absence of agency costs within the FDIC. If
the interests of the FDIC and its employees diverge systematically, the
FDIC's control of the resolution process does not guarantee resolutions that
maximize asset values. Agency costs plague all large organizations, but
public organizations like the FDIC may be less able to incentivize their
agents. While the FDIC control will lead to some sub-optimal resolution
decisions, we suggest in subsection A that FDIC control may be the best
available alternative. The third assumption concerns liability structure. The
liability structure of the very largest banks looks very different from that of
the vast majority of failed banks, and the FDIC might not be the residual
claimant should these very large banks fail. In this case Congress could
subject these banks to special resolution rules that weaken the FDIC's
control. Subsection B does not recommend such rules because of concern
that banks may manipulate their capital structure to trigger these rules. A
fourth assumption is that a resolution process is needed and that someone
must control this process. A number of commentators have suggested
changes in the capital structure of banks, primarily the increased use of
convertible debt that could make bank failure far less common. We do not
address these proposals in detail because we take the existing capital structure
of banks as given. Even if the convertible debt is made part of a bank's
capital structure, an insolvency regime still is needed where the value of
convertible securities is insufficient to return the failed bank to financial
health. Others propose conversion mechanisms that could, in theory, resolve
failed institutions "automatically," without significant involvement by the
FDIC or a court. Subsection C argues even an automatic conversion
159. This is a standard application of the Modigliani-Miller h-relevance Theorem. See
Franco Modigliani & Merton H. Miller, The Cost of Capital, Corporation Finance and the
Theory of Investment, 48 Am. EcoN. REv. 261, 278 (1958) (showing that optimal capital
structure can depend on bankruptcy costs).
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mechanism would still usually leave the FDIC with a substantial role in the
resolution of failed banks.
A. Agency Costs in Bank Resolutions
Section III claims that the FDIC is the residual claimant and thus would
maximize social value if it followed the law's command that it exercise its
authority in a way that results in the least cost to the deposit insurance
fund. 160  However, the FDIC does not (and cannot) actually exercise any
authority. Its employees must act on its behalf, and these employees will
have interests that diverge from those of the primary stakeholders in the
FDIC-the member banks and the taxpayers. The employees' interests likely
include a desire for income, leisure and career advancement, in some
combination. 16 1 Because FDIC employees' salaries are fixed, the outcome of
a bank resolution has no effect on their income. It might also not affect any
of their other interests. Accordingly, FDIC employees might act to serve
their interests even at the expense of the FDIC's interest in resolving a failed
bank. The divergence of the FDIC and its employees' interests creates
agency Costs. 12Agency costs may prevent the FDIC's employees from
making decisions that minimize the cost to the insurance fund and maximize
social welfare. They might, for example, engage in too little marketing
efforts and thereby sell the assets for less than they are worth. Alternatively,
they might incur excessive costs in managing the disposition of assets.
Intra-organizational agency costs are not unique to the FDIC; large
private organizations face these same costs. We might, however, expect
private organizations to be better able to control these agency costs. The
FDIC may be less able to design its employment contracts to align its
160. See 12 U.S.C. § 1823 (c)(4)(A) (2006) (requiring the FDIC to implement the
lowest costing resolution). "Public interest' here is understood broadly. The deposit
insurance fund is funded by assessment against participating banks, not by tax revenues.
However, bank resolutions that minimize costs to the deposit insurance fund make it
unlikely that tax revenues will be used to subsidize failed banks. More generally, resolving
failed banks maintains the integrity of the banking system. Both matters are concerns of
"public interest."
161. Cf. Arnoud W.A. Boot & Anjan V. Thakor, Self-Interested Bank Regulation, 83
Am. EcoN. Rnv. 206, 208 (1993) (assuming that bank regulators maximize a combination of
good supervisory reputation and social welfare).
162. Agency costs are the sum of monitoring and bonding costs, and residual loss to the
FDIC when its employees act on its behalf. See generally Michael C. Jensen & William H.
Meckling, Theory of the Firm. Managerial Behavior, Agency Costs and Ownership
Structure, 3 J. FiN. ECON. 305 (1976).
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employees' interests with its own,16 3 and the FDIC may be subject to
political pressure'64 or lobbying efforts on behalf of special interest groups.
A number of scholars who have examined banking regulation prior to
insolvency suggest that agency costs have resulted in lax supervision of the
soundness of banks or thrifts.165  As a remedy, they propose reforms that
would shift more risk to the private sector and thereby induce private sector
actors to monitor the debtor or provide more accurate measures of risk.'1
66
These arguments presume that the private organizations that assume this risk
would be better able to solve the agency problems and therefore better able to
monitor the debtor. If private sector actors are better able to monitor a bank's
activity before insolvency, they may be better able to dispose of a bank's
assets after it becomes insolvent. If public regulators are better monitors than
dispersed creditors holding limited debt, they may have an advantage at
disposing of these assets. We do not engage the debate over the relative
merits of public versus private decision-making.1
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The presence of agency costs does not doom the argument for FDIC
control. This is because agency costs are inevitable with the sort of decisions
163. See Christopher James, The Losses Realized in Bank Failures, 46 J. FIN. 1223,
1224 (1991) (explaining that "the FDIC may have less of an incentive to maximize the value
of assets in liquidation than private market participants since the compensation of
government liquidators does not depend on the outcome of their actions").
164. See, e.g., Edward J. Kane, Principal-Agent Problems in S&L Salvage, 45 J. FIN.
755, 755-56 (1990) (explaining that the FDIC is a potential scapegoat "that politicians may
conveniently plan to blame for any scandals or apparent cost overruns that emerge").
165. See Edward J. Kane, The Incentive Incompatibility of Government-Sponsored
Deposit-Insurance Funds, in THE REFORM OF FEDERAL DEPOSIT INSURANCE: DISCIPLINING THE
GOVERNMENT AND PROTECTING TAxPAYERS 144, 147 (James R. Barth & R. Dan Brumbaugh,
Jr. eds., 1992) ("The limited life observed for government-sponsored funds is less a matter of
bad economic luck or specific 'mistakes' in regulatory management than of generic principal-
agent problems that support structural imbalances in their information, monitoring,
enforcement, and incentive systems." (citations omnitted)); KANE, supra note 104, at I
(explaining that "congressional procedures for budgeting and for overseeing the operations of
the deposit-insurance bureaucracy made the regulatory strategy of cover-up and deferral
practically irresistible"); Ash Demirguc-Kunt, Deposit-Institution Failures: A Review of the
Empirical Literature, 25:4 ECON. REV. 2, 2 (1989), available at http://www.clevelandfed.
org/research/review/1989/89-q4-DemnirgucKunt.pdf ("This dramatic increase in the bank
failure rate has intensified public criticism of deposit-institution regulators, since bank safety
and soundness is a major regulatory responsibility." (footnote omnitted)).
166. See generally FEDERAL RESERVE BANK OF CHICAGO, MARKET DISCIPLINE ACROSS
COUNTRIES AND INDUSTRIES (Claudio Borio et al. eds., 2004); Mark J. Flannery, The Faces
of "Market Discipline", 20 J. FIN. SERVICES REs. 107 (2001).
167. See MATHIAS DEWATRIPONT & JEAN TIROLE, THE PRUDENTIAL REGULATION OF
BANKS 29-45, 193-216 (Mass. Inst. Tech. 2d prtg. 1999) (1993) (discussing the differences
between public and private decision-making and between public and private regulation).
1028
WHY BA NKS ARE NOT ALLO WED IN BANKRUPTCY 12
that must be made by the FDIC. Decisions about the timing and terms of
asset dispositions are complex. They require discretion, whether the decision
maker is the FDIC or another authority. Oversight of these decisions can
eliminate some self-interested choices by the FDIC's employees, but perhaps
at the expense of the interests of the member banks and the taxpayers. After
all, the member banks and the taxpayers cannot effectively dispose of the
assets themselves. For this reason, over a range of decisions, there is a
tradeoff between the authority to decide how to dispose of assets and agency
costs. At the margin the optimal amount of agency costs in resolution
therefore is positive. Courts and commentators in other contexts reach a
similar conclusion. In corporate governance, the business judgment rule
protects the board of directors from liability for corporate decisions not
infected by illegality or conflict of interest. The rule prevents a court from
vetting a board's decision even when the decision harmed shareholders'
interests. By limiting judicial oversight, the rule enables directors sometimes
to act carelessly. The rule's policy justification is that the quality of
directorial decisions in the range of cases is worth the price. 18 The
justification implicitly recognizes that defensible legal rules can create or
allow agency costs. The observation applies equally to the FDIC's decisions
about asset dispositions and the resolution process. Thus, the FDIC's control
of the resolution process is not suspect simply because it creates agency costs
in asset dispositions.
Most important, the arguments above take the existing capital structure
of banks as given. The structure is one in which insured deposits
predominate; banks have some secured debt, and rarely, much subordinated
or general debt. As a practical matter the FDIC owns failed banks: It has the
residual claim on the banks' assets. Given this structure, it is hard to find
other actors with better incentives, even if the incentives of the FDIC's
employees are imperfect. Insured depositors have no incentive to see that the
sale of the bank's assets gets top dollar: Their deposits are protected;
however, the assets are liquidated. As noted above, the senior claimants
(FHLB loans and other secured loans) and junior claimants (general creditors,
subordinated debt holders and equity holders) obviously do not have the right
incentives, as the former are always paid in full and the latter will almost
always receive nothing. One could grant some decision-making power to the
very few uninsured depositors who have failed to get out before failure and
168. See, e.g., Stephen M. Bainbridge, The Business Judgment Rule as Abstention
Doctrine, 57 VAND. L. REv. 83, 109 (2004) ("In the director primacy model ... the business
judgment rule is justified precisely because judicial review threatens the board's authority.").
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perhaps have a judge adjudicate disputes among them. However, this
supervision would impose its own costs. As noted in Section III.B., most
uninsured depositors withdraw their funds prior to the bank's failure, and the
depositors that remain behind will, almost by definition, be the least attentive.
These depositors are likely to be widely dispersed, and they therefore may be
poorly situated to monitor the resolution process. Recall that the push for a
centralized agency with power to resolve failed banks stemmed not from
deposit insurance but from a perception that existing receiverships were
plagued by inefficiency and self-dealing by receivers.
Although we lack direct measures of these agency costs, the literature
offers some related evidence. A study by Christopher James shows that
(1) the FDIC's losses tend to increase with the percentage of the bank's assets
that it retains, and (2) the direct costs of bank insolvencies average around
10% of assets, far higher than the averages found in other studies of
bankruptcy reorganizations.169 Neither result clearly establishes the presence
of substantial agency costs. The first result is consistent with the FDIC not
being as adept as private banks at selling or managing bank assets. It is also,
however, consistent with the possibility that acquirers are more willing to
purchase low-risk assets or performing loans due to adverse selection. James
tries to distinguish between these possibilities. Although he finds no
evidence that acquirers are less likely to purchase risky assets, he does not
disprove this possibility either. The second result is harder to interpret
169. See Christopher James, The Losses Realized in Bank Failures, 46 J. FIN. 1223, 1225,
1228 (1991) (noting a loss of approximately 10% in 1985 through 1986). Bennett and Una]
estimate mean direct resolution costs at 3.53% of book value, based on a large sample of bank
failures between 1986 and 2007. Rosalind L. Bennett & Haluk Unal, The Cost Effectiveness of
the Private-Sector Resolution of Failed Bank Assets, app. Table 2 (FDIC Ctr. for Fin. Research
Working Paper No. 2009-11, 2010), http://ssm.conm/abstract--1558445 (last visited Sept. 25,
2010) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review). For estimates of resolution costs
incurred by the Resolution Trust Corporation in disposing of failed savings and loan banks
between 1989 and 1995, see Mike Spaid & Edward D. Thomas, Evolution of the RTCs~
Resolution Practices, in FED. DEPOSIT INS. CORP., MANAGING TIHE CISIS: THE FDIC AND RTC
ExPERiENCE 1980-1994 113, 138-39 (1998). Other estimates which count opportunity costs
and declining asset values due to regulatory forbearance as resolution costs are higher. See
William P. Osterberg & James J. Thomson, UNDERLYING DETERMINANTS OF CLOSED-BANK
RESOLUON COSTS 6 (1994), available at http://www.clevelandfed.org/research/workpaper/
l994/wp9403.pdf (noting 2 1%). By comparison, the direct costs of traditional Chapter I I
reorganizations are much lower. Estimates of median direct costs vary between 1.4% and
1.69% of pre-bankruptcy assets. See Brian L. Betker, The Administrative Costs of Debt
Restructurings: Some Recent Evidence, 26:4 FIN. MGMT. 56, 57 (1997) (noting 3.93%); Arturo
Bris et al., The Costs of Bankruptcy: Chapter 7 Liquidation Versus Chapter I I
Reorganization, 61 J. FIN. 1253, 1284 (2006) (noting 1.69%); Lynn M LoPucki & Joseph W.
Doherty, The Determinants of Professional Fees in Large Bankruptcy Reorganization Cases, 1
J. Em~i'RicAt. LEGAL. STuD. 111, 113 (2004) (noting 1.4%).
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because it is unclear if one should expect similar direct bankruptcy costs in
bankruptcy and bank insolvency. When calculating direct costs of
bankruptcy reorganizations scholars typically include the cost of hiring
attorneys and business consultants but do not include the salaries of the
managers of the firm. By contrast, once the initial purchase and assumption
transaction is complete, the failed bank has no management left, and the
FDIC must incur the full costs of managing the estate. In addition, some
assets may simply be more expensive to administer than others.
Further evidence of the FDIC's performance comes from studies of the
return to holding the stocks of banks that acquire failed banks. If the FDIC
does a poor job of auctioning the failed firm and routinely offers too good of
a deal to acquirers, the share price of publicly traded acquirers should rise on
the announcement of the P&A agreement. Of course, the acquirers stock
may rise as long as the assets (or customer base) of the failed bank are
somewhat unique so that potential buyers assign different valuations and the
acquirer captures some of the gains from trade. However, a very substantial
rise in price would provide some cause for concern. The literature does not,
however, conclusively show that the FDIC is selling failed banks for far less
than they are worth. Some early studies do find abnormal returns to
acquiring banks 170 while others do not.'171 Part of the divergence in findings
nmay he due to changes in the process of resolving failed banks; many of the
studies finding no abnormal return focus on thrifts resolved through public
option. Unfortunately, no study looks at transactions since the least cost
resolution standard was adopted in 1992.
B. The Liability Structure of Large Banks
Section III shows that the overwhelming majority of failed banks have a
similar liability structure. The majority of their debts are deposits, most of
170. See generally William J. Bertin et al., Failed Bank Acquisitions and Successful
Bidders'Returns; 18:2 FiN. MGMT. 93 (1989); Rebel A. Cole et al., Asymmetric Information
and Principal-Agent Problems as Sources of Value in FSLIC-Assisted Acquisitions Of
Insolvent Thrifts, 8 J. FiN. SERVICES REs. 5 (1994); Christopher James & Peggy Weir, An
Analysis of EDIC Failed Bank Auctions, 20 J. MONETARY ECON. 141 (1987).
171. See Thomas F. Gosnell et al., The Acquisition of Failing Thrifts: Returns to
Acquirers, 22:4 FIN. MGMT. 58, 60 (1993) (finding no abnormal returns); Paul M. Horvitz &
Insup Lee, Abnormal Returns in Post-FRREA Acquisitions of Failed Thrifts, 8 J. FIN.
SERVICES Rrs. 269, 269 (1994) (announcing that "acquisitions of failed S&Ls in the post-
FIRREA period have not been accompanied by positive abnormal returns"); Richard H.
Pettway & Jack W. Trifts, Do Banks Overbid When Acquiring Failed Banks?, 14:2 FIN.
MGMT. 5, 5-6, 12 (1985) (finding negative abnormal returns).
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which are insured. They also have no or very little foreign deposits, general
unsecured debt or subordinated debt. Some banks do have secured liabilities,
but these liabilities are always paid in full. This makes the FDIC the likely
residual claimant in nearly all bank failures. However, a properly designed
bank insolvency law must take into account the likely residual claimant on
most of the assets of failed banks. It must consider the size of assets of failed
banks, not just the frequency with which banks fail. Showing that the FDIC
is the residual claimant in 99% of bank failures means little if the remaining
1% of banks own almost all the assets of failed banks. Asset size matters
because the liability structure of the very largest banks differs from that of
banks with fewer assets.
In the United States, banking assets are, in fact, concentrated in the
largest banks. This remains true whether one examines banks generally or
failed banks in particular. In 2008 about 1.4% of insured financial
institutions (commercial and savings and loan banks) had assets greater than
$10 billion. These "mega-banks" owned about 78% of all assets of insured
financial institutions, 1 2 and the as set share of mega-banks has increased
consistently over time."17 Measured by their assets, mega-banks also
predominate in bank failures. Insured bank institutions with assets greater
than $10 billion account for about 3% of the banks that failed between
January 1, 1995 and May 31, 2009. However, these banks held 87% of the
assets of banks in failure during our sample period.
The capital structures of most'failed banks with assets greater than five
or ten billion dollars do, in fact, look like those of most other failed banks.
Since 1995 the FDIC has resolved five banks with real assets greater than $5
billion (adjusted for inflation). The four smallest of these had deposits that
ranged between 64% and 82% of liabilities and insured deposits that ranged
between 76% and 91% of total deposits; none of these four banks had any
foreign deposits.'714  Secured loans (FHLB plus repurchase agreements)
accounted for most of the remaining liabilities; these loans ranged from 18%
to 35% of total liabilities. None of these four banks had appreciable amounts
172. U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, FDIC-INSURED FiNANciAL INSTIUTIONS By ASSET SIZE:
2008, available at http://www.census.gov/compendiastatab2010/tables/lsl 142.pdf.
173. Kenneth D. Jones & Tim Critchfield, Consolidation in the US. Banking Industry:
Is the "Long, Strange Trip" A bout to End?, 17 FDIC BANKING REv. 31, 34-36 (2005).
174. In the aggregate, banks with more than $10 billion in assets do have significant
foreign deposits. Deposits in foreign offices account for about one-quarter of all deposits at
these banks. FDIC, Statistics on Depository Institutions Report, http://www2.fdic.gov/sdi/
main.asp (last visited Sept. 25, 2010) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review).
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of subordinated debt or general claims; the sum of these two categories
ranged from 0.9% to 1.9% of total liabilities.
However, the fifth bank, Washington Mutual, had a capital structure that
was appreciably different than the rest, and Washington Mutual was far
larger than all of the other banks put together. In fact, Washington Mutual
Bank alone accounts for more than 70% of the assets of the failed banks in
our sample.175 Washington Mutual had significant debts that were junior to
the claims of the FDIC. Washington Mutual's subordinated debt accounted
for 2.8% and its general claims 9.9% of liabilities.176 It is dangerous to draw
conclusions from a sample of one, but seemingly healthy banks of similar
size also have significant claims that are junior to the FDIC. For example,
Wells Fargo has subordinated debt that accounts for 3.2% of its liabilities and
general claims that account for about 11.6%. Other banks have significant
debt that is junior to the FDIC in the form of foreign deposits. Foreign
deposits represent about 13% of Bank of America's liabilities and 68% of
Citigroup's liabilities.17
7
The presence of significant debt junior to the FDIC's claim makes it less
likely that the FDIC would be the residual claimant should insolvency
necessitate a resolution. The least-cost resolution standard requires the FDIC
ordinarily to resolve a failed bank in a way that imposes the least cost on the
insurance fund.'178 The FDIC is not explicitly required to do so in a way that
maximizes the return to the junior claims as well. Subrogated to the rights of
insured depositors, the FDIC therefore has the incentive only to receive an
175. See supra note 27 (observing that Washington Mutual accounted for $307 billion
of $417 billion worth of assets of banks that failed between January 1, 1995 and October 19,
2009). Large nonbank firms represent a fraction of Chapter 11I bankruptcies. In 2008 less
than 1% of all bankruptcy cases were initiated by Chapter 11I filings, and only about 0.003%
were filed by large public corporations. See Bankruptcy Statistics, http://www.uscourts.
gov/Statistics/BankruptcyStatistics.aspx (last visited Sept. 25. 2010) (on file with the
Washington and Lee Law Review). According to Lynn LoPucki, of the 1,117,771
bankruptcy filings in 2008, there were thirty-nine large public bankruptcies among 10,160
Chapter 11I filings. LYNN M. LoPucKi's BANKR. RESEARCH DATABASE, LARGE, PUBLIC
COMPANY BANKRUPTCIES FILED IN THE UNITED STATES, BY YEAR, 1990-2009, available at
http://lopucki.law.ucla.edu/Filings%/20by/20year.pdf.
176. These figures are taken from Washington Mutual's final Thrift Supervision report
filed before it closed. In the ten weeks before closing, depositors withdrew about 9% of
deposits made by the bank, and this would have changed its liability structure. Robin Sidel
et al., WaMu is Seized, Sold Off to JP. Morgan, In Largest Failure in US. Banking History,
WALL ST. J., Sept. 26, 2008, at Al.
177. See 2009 Call Reports for Bank of America and Citigroup (providing these
statistics).
178. See supra note 84 and accompanying text (discussing this requirement imposed by
Congress).
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amount equal to the insured depositors' claims. For this reason, the FDIC's
control over the resolution process in large bank failures is unlikely to
maximize the value of the failed bank's assets.
Washington Mutual Bank's resolution illustrates this concern. At its
closing, the bank's assets had a book value of $307 billion. The FDIC
transferred most of the assets to J.P. Morgan Chase Bank as part of a
purchase and assumption transaction. In return J.P. Morgan paid $1.9 billion
and acquired certain of Washington Mutual's contracts and all of its deposits
and liability to general creditors. J.P. Morgan did not assume Washington
Mutual's subordinated debt or equity.179 Subordinated debt and equity will
receive nothing while the depositors and general creditors will be paid in full
by J.P. Morgan. Because J.P. Morgan acquired all of Washington Mutual's
deposits, there was no loss to the FDIC. If J.P. Morgan paid top dollar for
Washington Mutual's assets, subordinated debt has no complaint. It has a
complaint if another bidder would have paid more: a higher bid price might
have allowed distributions to subordinated debt. Because J.P. Morgan's bid
resulted in no loss to the insurance fund, the FDIC had no incentive to seek or
accept a higher-valued bid. Washington Mutual's holding company, the
holder of subordinated debt, has sued the FDIC, presumably on the theory
that the liquidation value of Washington Mutual's assets is sufficiently higher
than the sum J.P. Morgan paid to partly or wholly satisf~y its claims.'80 Its
suit might fail on the merits. However, Washington Mutual's liability
structure does not justify a presumption in favor of the FDIC: Because the
FDIC is not the residual claimant, its control of the resolution process cannot
be assumed to maximize asset values.
The particular liability structure of large banks does not necessarily
undermine the case for FDIC control of the bank resolution process. This
exception applies only to the very largest banks, and these failures are very
rare-these are the firms that are "too big to fail." The FDIC is the residual
claimant in almost all bank failures. At most, the liability structure of large
banks justifies special resolution rules for large banks or banks with
substantial claims subordinate or equal to the FDIC in priority that would
constrain the FDIC's discretion or force it to share control. There is some
precedent for special rules tied to the size or nature of the debtor. The
179. Purchase and Assumption Agreement Among Federal Deposit Insurance
Corporation and J.P. Morgan Chase Bank, Sept. 25, 2008, Article 2. 1, Schedule 2. 1, at 8,
34, available at http://www.fdic.gov/about/freedomlWashington-MutualP-and-A.pdf.
180. See Washington Mutual Inc. v. Federal Deposit Insurance Corp., Civ. Action No.
09-533(RMC), 2009 WL 3273880, at *1 (D.D.C. 2009) (considering a motion by note
holders to intervene as a defendant).
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Bankruptcy Code includes separate provisions for small business debtors in
Chapter 11I by way of separate reporting requirements and deadlines.' 81 Their
underlying rationale apparently is that small businesses seeking to be
reorganized differ enough from larger businesses to warrant some special
rules. In large bank insolvencies, special rules might better protect other
creditors as it is less likely that the FDIC would be the only residual claimant.
These rules could include enhanced bid procedures, input by junior debt, or
an increase in the potential liability of the FDIC to junior debt in connection
with the disposal of assets.'1
82
We do not advocate such rules because banks may manipulate their
assets or liabilities for reasons unrelated or antithetical to the purpose behind
these rules.'183 By offering higher interest rates a bank could raise deposits in
the short run and use the funds to acquire the assets necessary to trigger the
special rules. 184  Alternatively, the bank could obtain equity injections
181. See, e.g., I11 U.S.C. §§ 101(5 1D), 308(b), 586(a)(7), 1121(c), 1125(f) (2006)
(providing procedures for small business debtors).
182. Recent legislative proposals move in the opposite direction. As we discuss in the
next section, these proposals would place the FDIC in charge of resolving large bank
holding companies even when it has no claim on the assets of these firms.
183. A separate set of legal rules for specific sorts of actors by itself is not unusual or
controversial. Commercial and securities law sometimes has separate rules tailored to
different sorts of transactions or transacting parties. Perhaps the best illustration is Article 2
of the Uniform Commercial Code's rules governing merchants. See, e.g., U.C.C. § 2-104(1),
2-205, 2-207(2)(a), 2-314(a), 2-509(2) (2009) (providing various rules that apply to those
considered "merchants"). In a securities offering Regulation D gives a safe harbor based on
the size of the offering: limited offerings below $ 1-5 million are not subject to enhanced
disclosure requirements; offerings above $5 million are public offerings requiring mandated
disclosures. 17 C.F.R. § 230.504-505 (2009). Another safe harbor allows issuers to raise
unlimited amounts of money from accredited investors in private offerings. See id.
§ 230.506 (providing such an exemption for limited offerings). These safe harbors
effectively allow securities issuers to select the amount of disclosure they must make by
adjusting the amount of their securities offering. However, usually such rules are triggered
by attributes of affected parties that do not allow for strategic manipulation by them.
Merchant status, for instance, is an attribute that cannot be manipulated in the short term by
a seller or buyer of goods. Accredited investor status also is unalterable in the short term.
By contrast, banks can manage their assets or liabilities in the short-term, particularly
through transactions with their affiliates or holding companies, to achieve a desired size.
184. There are numerous examples of troubled banks using high interest rates to attract
deposits. See, e.g., Kathleen Pender, Tricky Situations over Interest Rates at Ally Bank, S.F.
CHRON, June 16, 2009, at ClI ("Although many well-rated banks offer above-average yields,
it's not unusual to see banks on the verge of failure offering the highest rates in an effort to
stay afloat."). "IndyMac Bank was at or near the top of Bankrate's list before it was taken
over by the FDIC last summer. Countrywide was also one of the top yielders before it was
forced into Bank of America's arms." Id The FDIC is aware of this risk and limits the
interest rate that banks can offer when they are deemed to be not well capitalized. See 12
C.F.R. § 337 (taking effect December 3, 2009, banks that are not well-capitalized cannot
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disguised as subordinated debt from its holding company. In the final period
before insolvency the depositors may flee, the subordinated debt may
disappear, and the assets may fall in value. However, these changes in the
financial condition might not be reflected in the bank's quarterly Call Report
before failure. As a result, the resolution authority may be unable to tell how
control should be allocated until it audits the bank's financial statements.
This takes time. Moreover, if the special rules are triggered by size, the bank
could qualify' as "large" without its creditors having a residual interest in its
assets.
The prospect of recapitalization or other financial support unavailable in
the alternative bank resolution procedure creates moral hazard. The
availability of financial support may confer a competitive advantage on banks
deemed to present systemic risk. This could induce further bank
consolidation that in turn increases such risk in the first place. We do not
argue that a separate resolution procedure for large banks is unjustified under
all conditions. Our point is more modest: the unique liability structure of the
largest banks does not necessarily undermine the case for the FDIC's control
over the resolution of failed banks.
C. Self-Financed Restructuring: Debt Conversion
By asking whether the FDIC should control the resolution of insolvent
banks, this Article presumes the need of a resolution procedure. A number of
authors have suggested regulatory reforms designed to resolve insolvency
without a formal procedure. 185 Specifically, they suggest that banks be forced
to issue substantial amounts of debt that would convert into equity as the
value of the firm's assets declines.8 6 We do not engage this debate for two
offer a rate higher than seventy-five basis points above the rate prevailing in the market).
The prospect of a favorable resolution procedure exacerbates the incentive of troubled banks
to attract deposits.
185. See, e.g., Mark J. Flannery, No Pain, No Gain? Effecting Market Discipline via
"Reverse Convertible Debentures," in CAPITAL ADEQUACY BEYOND BASEL: BANKING,
SECURITES, AND INSURANCE 171, 171 (Hal S. Scott ed., 2005) (proposing "a new financial
instrument that forestalls financial distress without distorting bank shareholders' risk-taking
incentives"); Squam Lake Working Group on Financial Regulation, An Expedited Resolution
Mechanism for Distressed Financial Firms: Regulatory Hybrid Securities 2 (Council on
Foreign Relations Working Paper, Apr. 2009) (recommending "support for a new regulatory
hybrid security that will expedite the recapitalization of banks").
186. Consider an example based on Flannery's article. Assume that a bank begins with
assets of $1,000, must maintain equity capital equal to 8% of its assets ($80), and has
convertible debt equal to an additional 5% of its assets ($50). If the bank's assets decline in
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reasons. First, we take the existing capital structure of banks as given.
Second, convertible debt (or enhanced equity requirements) can reduce, but
cannot eliminate, the risk of insolvency. If the bank's assets fall sharply in
value, there may not be enough convertible debt to return the bank to
solvency.
Debt conversion can, however, be used as a resolution mechanism.
Chapter 11 of the bankruptcy code is, in fact, one such mechanism. The
earliest bankruptcy systems resolved failed firms by selling their assets in the
market and distributing the proceeds to their creditors in accordance with
priority.187 This is still the predominant method used today; most bankrupt
firms are liquidated in Chapter 7188 The FDIC's favored resolution method,
a purchase and assumption, in effect is a liquidation coupled with the
assumption of some of the failed bank's liabilities by another firm .189 By
contrast, a traditional Chapter 11 reorganization can resolve a failed firm
without an actual sale of its assets.190 The assets are instead effectively
transferred among the existing claimants in a hypothetical sale. Junior claims
are cancelled if the assets are insufficient to pay the more senior claimants in
full, and some of the remaining debt is typically converted into equity to
return the firm to solvency. The value of the firm's assets is determined by
value to $970, capital requirements would force the bank to have $77.50 in equity, and so
$27.60 of the debt would convert into equity. If the bank's assets fall further in value to
$900 (far enough to render the firm insolvent if the $50 in initial debt had not been
convertible), the remainder of the convertible debt would be exchanged for equity. The bank
would eventually need to issue more equity, but it would remain solvent. If asset prices fall
sufficiently slowly to allow regulators to force the bank to continually issue more
convertible debt securities, this system could ensure that the bank never becomes insolvent.
Note, however, that regulators could also keep the bank solvent by simply setting equity
capital requirements at 13% instead of setting an equity capital requirement of 8% and
requiring an additional 5% of convertible debt. Convertible debt may, however, offer other
advantages. For example, the ability of the bank to issue junior debt and the interest rate that
it must pay may provide useful information to regulators about the true risk of the bank's
assets. These pre-insolvency advantages are beyond the scope of this Article.
187. See, e.g., Bankruptcy Act of 1800, ch. 19, §§ 29-31, 2 Stat. 19, 29-30 (1800)
(providing for division of bankrupt's estate); Bankruptcy Act of 1841, ch. 9, §§ 3-4, 5 Stat.
440, 442-444 (providing for seizure of bankrupt's property).
188. See I11 U.S.C. §§ 701-84 (2006) (providing rules for liquidation process in
bankruptcy); Bankruptcy Statistics, United States Courts, http://www.uscourts.gov-
bnkrpctystats/statistics.htm#june (last visited Sept. 25, 2010) (providing bankruptcy
statistics) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review).
189. See supra notes 11-15 and accompanying text (discussing FDIC resolution of
bankruptcies).
190. See supra notes 40-52 and accompanying text (discussing Chapter 11I
bankruptcy).
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the agreement of the parties in a consensual reorganization or by the
bankruptcy judge in a cramdown.
Recently, at least one scholar has drawn upon prior literature to propose
a bank resolution mechanism that would convert a troubled bank's capital
structure "automatically" or with minimal proceedings.' 9' This conversion
mechanism would follow the priority structure so that junior claims could be
cancelled if the assets of the bank were less than the aggregate value of more
senior claims.'19 2  For example, assume that banks must meet a required
minimum capital ratio of 8%. Suppose a bank that has issued 10 shares of
common stock becomes insolvent as the value of its assets fall from $ 1,000 to




($120) Equity (10 shares)
The bank's assets are sufficient to satisfy only $800 of the $920 in
outstanding claims against it. Thus, to return to solvency, the ten shares and
$120 in debt must be cancelled. To meet the minimum capital requirements
an additional $64 of debt must be converted into equity. Because general
claims have lower priority than deposits, the general claims totaling $50 are
extinguished. Similarly, $70 of the deposits must be extinguished and $64 of
the deposits must be converted into equity,' 93 leaving $736 in deposit
191. See Luigi Zingales, Yes We Can, Secretary Geithner, 6 EcONoMIST'S VOICE 1, 3
(2009) [hereinafter Zingales, Yes We Can] (proposing "a new form of bankruptcy for banks,
where derivative contracts are kept in place and the long term debt is swapped into equity").
Professor Zingales does not fully develop this mechanism in his short piece, Luigi Zingales,
Plan B, 5 ECONOMIST'S VOICE 1 (2008) [hereinafter Zingales, Plan B] (discussing solutions
to the financial crisis). For earlier proposals that apply to all firms, not just banks, see Barry
E. Adler, Financial and Political Theories of American Corporate Bankruptcy, 45 STAN. L.
REv. 311. 323 (1993) (proposing a "Chameleon Equity" approach); Note, Distress-
Contingent Convertible Bonds: A Proposed Solution to the Excess Debt Problem, 104
HARV. L. REv. 1857, 1869-77 (1991) (discussing distress-contingent convertible bonds).
Many of the proposals call for debt conversion by contract; the description in the text
provides for mandatory conversion under the prescribed conditions. See Zingales, Yes We
Can, supra note 191, at 3 (calling for legislation creating "a new form of bankruptcy for
banks").
192. See Zingales, Yes We Can, supra note 191, at 4 (discussing the proposal's effect
on junior claimants).
193. The mechanism need not formally cancel any debt that is equal in priority to the
residual claim. If, for example, the mechanism "converted" $13.40 in deposits to equity and
cancelled no deposits, the market would quickly cancel $7 by revealing that the equity is
worth just $6.40.
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liabilities. This does not deprive insured depositors of access to the insured
balances in their deposit accounts. Insured depositors are reimbursed by the
FDIC from the bank insurance fund in the amount of their insured deposits.
Their interests therefore are unaffected by the conversion of their debt into
equity.'194  The FDIC in turn is subrogated to the rights of depositors it
reimburses, to the extent of the reimbursement.' 95 Applicable priority rules
give insured and uninsured depositors equal priority in a bank resolution. 
196
Thus, the FDIC and the bank's uninsured depositors (if any) are issued shares
in proportion to their share of the $64 in deposits converted to equity. The
FDIC can sell its shares, as it can sell almost any asset in a bank's
resolution. 197
Automatic debt conversion offers speed and reduced administrative
Costs.'198 However, even a truly automatic debt conversion mechanism would
likely fail to yield these benefits unless the capital structures of banks are
radically changed. If applied to the banks that have actually failed, these
proposals would have granted the FDIC most (and in most cases nearly all) of
the shares of the failed bank. The FDIC will have to sell these shares;
financial constraints force it to do so. The costs of such sales might equal or
194. See Zingales, Yes We Can, supra note 19 1, at 5 (proposing such a debt conversion
scheme). Zingales' proposed debt conversion scheme for systemically important banks
exempts individual depositor liability. See Zingales, Plan B, supra note 191, at 4 ("My pian
would exempt individual depositors, who are federally ensured."). Because conversion does
not affect the liquidity to insured individual deposits, the exemption is unnecessary.
195. See 12 U.S.C. § 182 1(g) (2006) (providing for subrogation).
196. See id. § 1821(d)(1 1)(A)(ii) (giving equal priority to "[amny deposit liability of the
institution").
197. See supra notes 11-17 and accompanying text (discussing resolution by the
FDIC).
198. See supra note 169 (discussing costs of resolution). Estimates of the direct costs
to the FDIC, although imprecise, are as high as 21% of asset values. Supra note 169. By
comparison, the direct costs of traditional Chapter 11I reorganizations are much lower.
Estimates of median direct costs vary between 1.4% and 1.69% of pre-bankruptcy assets.
See Arturo Bris et al., The Costs of Bankruptcy: Chapter 7 Versus Chapter I1I
Reorganization, 61 J. FiN. 1253, 1277, 1284 (2006) (providing a median direct cost of 1.69%
of pre-bankruptcy assets); Lynn M LoPucki & Joseph W. Doherty, The Determinants Of
Professional Fees in Large Bankruptcy Reorganization Cases, I J. EMP. LEGAL STUD. I111,
127 (2004) (providing a median direct cost of 1.4% of pre-bankruptcy assets); Brian L.
Betker, The Administrative Costs of Debt Restructurings: Some Recent Evidence, 26 FiN.
MGMT. 56, 61 (1996) (providing a median direct cost of 3.37% of pre-bankruptcy assets);
Lawrence A. Weiss, Bankruptcy Resolution: Direct Costs and Violation of Priority of
Claims, 27 J. FiN. EcoN. 285, 299 (1990) (providing a median direct cost of 2.5% of pre-
bankruptcy assets).
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exceed the costs the FDIC currently incurs in selling the assets of failed bank
through a receivership.' 
9 9
A debt exchange in almost every past bank failure would have left the
FDIC as the majority shareholder because almost all failed banks have no or
little debt subordinate to deposits and little uninsured deposits at the time of
failure .200 At the same time, insured deposits are the major liabilities of most
banks .20' Because the FDIC is subrogated to the claims of insured depositors,
it ultimately shares loss with uninsured depositors when a bank fails. The
consistent pattern of FDIC loss shows that depositors lose money in most
bank failures .202  Thus, a debt exchange will give depositors equity in the
typical failed bank. The FDIC will receive the largest share of equity,
because insured deposits represent most deposit liabilities of typical failed
banks. However, the FDIC is unlike holders of swapped debt in nonbank
firms. Creditors in nonbank firms whose debt has been converted to equity
might want to retain it. The conversion can give them a control premium in
the firm stock. Alternatively, the equity can give a creditor a strategic
advantage in the relevant industry. More generally, financial constraints do
not generally restrict their ability to hold firm stock. The FDIC is different.
It cannot retain large equity positions that come from debt conversions of
failed banks. To avoid exhausting the balance of the deposit insurance fund,
the FDIC must sell bank assets, and FDIC policy requires as much.20 For the
199. See supra notes 11-15 (discussing receivership under FDIC).
200. Required increases in the amount of unsecured claims or subordinated debt would
increase the amount of debt junior to deposit liabilities, that could be converted into equity.
Alternatively, required increases in the amount of equity would avoid the risk of insolvency
altogether. The relative merits of these proposed requirements are beyond the scope of this
Article. For assessments of the proposals, see generally Douglas D. Evanoff & Larry D.
Wall, Subordinated Debt and Bank Capital Reform (Fed. Res. Bank of Chicago, WP 2000-
07, Aug. 2000); Study Group on Subordinated Notes and Debentures, Staff Study 172:
Using Subordinated Debt as an Instrument of Market Discipline, (Fed. Res. Sys., Dec.
1999).
201. See supra Part II.B ("Domestic deposits account for the overwhelming majority of
bank liabilities, and almost all of these domestic deposits are insured.").
202. See supra Part II.B (discussing losses when banks fail).
203. See supra note 13 and accompanying text (discussing FDIC Asset Disposition
Manual suggested timelines for sales). The Federal Deposit Insurance Act requires the
balance of deposit insurance fund to satisfy a statutorily mandated minimum "designated
reserve ratio": The ratio of the balance of the deposit insurance fund to insured deposits.
See 12 U.S.C. § 1817(b)(3) (2006) (discussing the designated reserve ratio). Paying losses
to insured deposits reduces the balance in the fund, thereby also reducing the effective
reserve ratio. The designated reserve ratio therefore limits the amount available to the FDIC
to pay insured depositors. By increasing the fund balance, the FDIC in principle can pay
insured deposits while staying within the designated reserve ratio. The futnd balance can be
increased by increasing assessments against member banks, special assessments, or
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same reason, it would have to sell its equity in failed banks obtained under a
debt conversion scheme. Thus, debt conversion schemes do not avoid the
cost of asset sales in the case of failed banks. They merely postpone those
costs so that they are incurred later, outside of the formal resolution process.
Again, a plausible accounting must count these costs as resolution costs.
These costs might equal the administrative costs the FDIC currently incurs in
disposing of failed bank assets.
Automatic debt conversion increases the speed and reduces the cost of
the final resolution only if the FDIC can more easily dispose of the stock of a
failed bank than it can dispose of the assets of a failed bank through a
receivership. We see little reason why this would be true. Shares of a firm
are just a claim against all of the assets of that finm. Acquirers of failed banks
have demonstrated that they do not want to buy the troubled assets of the
failed bank: Most purchase less than one quarter of the failed bank's
assets .20 True, acquirers may be more willing to purchase shares than
troubled assets because of the option inherent in a highly leveraged firm. The
acquirer would risk only the amount that they paid for the equity. Any
further decline in the value of the assets of the firm would be borne by the
holders of the debt (mainly the FDIC). However, the FDIC can, and does,
effectively replicate this structure in some current transactions. The FDIC
frequently sells all or substantially all of the assets of the failed bank to the
bank that assumes the deposits. In these sales the FDIC simultaneously
assumes the risk of a major decline in the value of these assets through a loss
sharing agreement.20
As noted in Part 111.13, the capital structure of the very largest banks
differ markedly from those of nearly all banks that have actually failed, and it
is more plausible that an automatic debt conversion mechanism would not
leave the FDIC as the dominant shareholder. 0 Because this Article uses
data from banks that have actually failed, it has little to say about the very
largest banks. Only one truly "mega-bank" has failed in the last fifteen years.
However, we question whether an automatic conversion mechanism would
really offer significant advantages over the current system. There are less and
borrowing from the Treasury. See id. § 181 7(b)(5) (describing emergency special
assessments); id § 1824(a) (describing FDIC's borrowing authority). Political resistance
makes these options infeasible on an ongoing basis. In practice the balance in the deposit
insurance fuind is fixed. Thus, to maintain the designated reserve ratio, the FDIC generally
must sell bank assets in order to pay insured deposits.
204. See supra note 81 and accompanying text (providing relevant statistics).
205. See supra Part 11.13 (discussing loss sharing agreements).
206. See supra Part III.B. (discussing the FDIC as residual claimant).
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more serious problems of design. The less serious problem is the authority to
trigger the conversion of debt to equity and cancellation of existing equity.
Stakeholders do not have complete information about the value of the assets
and therefore are likely to have different opinions about the bank's assets'
values. They therefore are unlikely to all agree on the need for
recapitalization. The bank's balance sheet cannot be used as a reliable basis
of information, because it computes assets and equity at book value. Book
values tend to lag behind the market value of assets at troubled banks. 0
Because stakeholders are unlikely to trigger the debt conversion, the FDIC
(or some other entity) must have the authority to trigger it. A plausible and
observable trigger is the FDIC's seizure of a bank. This authority does not
give the FDIC control in resolving the bank: Its seizure of the bank simply
triggers the conversion of debt to equity. The FDIC's role is limited to
initiating the process by which debt is restructured automatically.
The more serious problem is the design of the financial trigger the FDIC
is to use to initiate the resolution process. 0 Debt is to be converted to equity
when the bank is economically insolvent: When all claims due against the
bank cannot be satisfied from its earnings. The conversion mechanism
requires some estimate of the market value of the firm's assets. However,
these estimates are sometimes difficult to gauge, indeterminate, and
manipulable. Loans are important assets of banks, and nonstandard terms in
commercial or installment loans and unobservable risk characteristics of
borrowers make many loans difficult to value when not traded in active
markets. Something similar might be true of securitized assets on a bank's
books. Market value in both cases is hard to determine. Financial triggers
based on share price cannot be used at all for banks in which equity is
privately held. Although the market price of traded shares can be used,
variance in daily trading prices can be random. Averaging traded prices over
a longer period avoids this trouble but brings another: Strategic manipulation
of share prices. For instance, debt holders expecting FDIC intervention
might short shares of the bank in an effort to drive the price down. A lower
209
share price allows them more shares if their debt is converted to equity.
207. See Joe Peek & Eric S. Rosengren, The Use of Capital Ratios to Trigger
Intervention in Problem Banks: Too Little, Too Late, NEw ENGLAND EcON. R~v.49, 51-52
(Sept./Oct. 1996) (noting a lag of reductions in leverage ratios behind deterioration in bank
health).
208. See infra notes 220-22 and accompanying text (discussing the resolution process).
209. See Flannery, supra note 185, at 186 (discussing how a trigger ratio should be
computed and how often it should be evaluated); Squam Lake Working Group on Financial
Regulation, supra note 185, at 4 (discussing triggers).
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Although this manipulation is unlikely to be successful with large banks
whose stock is actively traded, it might work with smaller banks whose
shares are less actively traded. A financial trigger geared to share value also
might entice management to try to lower share price by bringing FDIC
intervention, for the purpose of having conversion result in more shares
issued.
These problems in design do not make a debt conversion scheme
unworkable. However, they make implementing it infeasible for bank
resolutions. Methods of estimating the bank's value that use market
mechanisms likely cannot be applied. They rely on time and liquidity that
may not be available in the case of many failed banks. Take Bebchuck's
proposal to give stakeholders an option to purchase senior claims for their
face amount .2 Assume that the bank has two creditors, each with $100
claims having equal priority. Suppose the market price of the bank is $200.
Debt conversion cancels the shareholder's stock and transforms the creditors'
$200 claims to equity. Under Bebchuck's proposal, the shareholders are
entitled to regain their stock for the face amount of claims.21 If shareholders
believe that the bank is worth more than $200, they will repurchase their
stock. If they believe the bank is worth less than $200, they will not. In this
way the repurchase option avoids the need to rely on market price in
converting debt to equity.
Bebchuck's proposal requires liquidity and time that often is missing in
bank failures. The proposal sets a stipulated short period in which
stakeholders can exercise their options. 1 In the case of failed banks, this
period must be very short. Otherwise, uncertainty about the bank's capital
structure risks disrupting its operations. To exercise their options within the
period, stakeholders need funds quickly. This usually is not a problem where
the price of exercising their options is small relative to their wealth. But
liquidity is a problem when the required exercise price is proportionately
large even for institutional shareholders. Stakeholders with large illiquid
holdings can borrow funds in amounts needed to exercise their options.
However, the ability to borrow quickly is not guaranteed. A lender will not
make an unsecured loan for $200 if the market price of the shares in a bank is
less than $200. Although it might lend $200 on a secured basis, the lender
210. See Lucian Arye Bebchuk, A New Approach to Corporate Reorganizations, 101
HARv. L. REv. 775, 785 (1988) (proposing a new 'method of dividing the reorganization
pie,,).
211. See id at 781 (providing an example of the proposed approach).
212. See id. at 789 (proposing a "brief period between the issue date and the exercise
date").
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needs time to value collateral and obtain the required security interest. The
time needed can exceed the period in which the stakeholder can exercise its
option. Because the stipulated period must be very short in bank failures,
liquidity problems likely prevent stakeholders from exercising their purchase
opios In these cases the market price of the bank effectively is final: It
determines the division of value among the bank's stakeholders according to
their priority. By comparison, the pricing mechanism used in FDIC-led bank
resolutions works quickly. The FDIC solicits bids prior to closing the bank;
the winning bid usually determines the value of the bank.
V Bank Holding Companies and Nonbank Financial Companies
So far this Article has focused on the control of the resolution of failed
banks. We turn now to the holding companies that own the stock of these
banks or firms offering financial services. Most banks are affiliates of bank
holding companies. 1 While their bank subsidiaries are resolved by the
FDIC, the bank holding companies and their nonbank subsidiaries can, and
do, file for protection under the Bankruptcy Code. 1 Part III argued that the
FDIC should control the disposition of a failed bank's assets because it is the
residual claimant on those assets.26 This section asks whether this
justification supports proposals to alter the resolution procedure for certain
bank and financial holding companies. We conclude that it does not.
The comprehensive financial reform bill recently enacted by Congress
changes this allocation of resolution authority for the largest bank holding
companies and nonbank financial companies. 17  The legislation creates an
213. See Philippe Aghion et al., The Economics of Bankruptcy Reform, 8 J. L. EcoN. &
ORG. 523, 540 (1992) (providing alternatives to Chapter I11 reorganization). The alternative
proposed by Aghion et al. also gives stakeholders purchase options on equity. See id.
(discussing this proposal). Their stipulated period of one month in which these options are
exercisable enhances the ability of stakeholders to obtain needed funds. See id. at 535
(proposing a one month exercise period). However, a month is far longer than the time in
which bank failures plausibly must be resolved.
214. See supra note 29 and accompanying text (noting the high proportion of U.S.
banks owned by bank holding companies).
215. Some of their nonbank subsidiaries may also be ineligible for bankruptcy
protection. For example, insurance companies cannot file for bankruptcy. See 11I U.S.C.
§ 1 09(b)(2) (2006) (listing exclusions to the definition of debtor under chapter 7).
216. See supra Part III (discussing FDIC control of bank insolvencies).
217. See Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection (Dodd-Frank) Act,
Pub. L. No. 111-203 (West, Westlaw through 20 10 legislation), H.R. 4173, 111 th Cong.
(2010) (to be codified in scattered sections of 12 U. S.C.).
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"orderly liquidation authority" (OLA) for "covered financial companies.,28
Covered financial companies essentially include bank holding companies,
their nonbank and broker dealer subsidiaries, and nonbank financial
companies whose revenues mostly derive from financial activities .219 These
companies are subject to the OLA's special resolution procedure if their
actual or likely failure would have "serious adverse effects on financial
stability in the United States.",220  Although undefined, these effects
presumably include systemic risk to the U.S. financial market created by
default. The procedure is triggered by a voting among designated authorities
according to a voting rule adapted from the FDIC voting rule required for a
finding of systemic risk.22 Once triggered, the Secretary of Treasury will
222appoint the FDIC as receiver to liquidate the financial company. (The
FDIC in turn will appoint the Securities Investor Protection Corporation as
receiver to liquidate registered brokers or dealers subject to the OLA .)
2 2 1
Initiation of the Resolution Act's resolution procedure displaces the
Bankruptcy Code and ends an ongoing bankruptcy case of the holding
company or its covered subsidiaries. 2 The OLA requires the FDIC to
dispose of assets in a manner which, inter alia, is "necessary for purposes of
the financial stability of the United States and not for the purpose of
preserving the covered financial company.
2 1
The OLA's special resolution procedure gives the FDIC the authority to
provide direct assistance to these systematically important covered
companies, including covered bank holding companies. 2 The assistance
218. See id. §§ 201(a)(11), 202(a)(1), H.R. 4173 §§ 201 (a)(] 1), 202(a)(1) (defining the
term "financial company" and instructing how to properly commence an orderly liquidation).
219. See id. § 201(a)(1 1), (b), H.R. 4173 § 201(a)(1 1), (b) (defining the term "financial
company" and outlining the definitional criteria).
220. Id. § 203(b)(1), (2), H.R. 4173 § 203(b)(1), (2).
221. See id. § 203(a)(1), H.R. 4173 § 203(a)(1) (requiring parties to vote with regards to
the written recommendation); cf 12 U.S.C. § 1823(c)(G) (2006) (providing for emergency
determination of systemic risk by the FDIC Board of Directors); Financial Stability
Improvement Act of 2009, H.R. 3996, 111Ith Cong. § 1603(a)(1) (2009) (providing a similar
voting procedure for the Federal Reserve Board).
222. See Dodd-Frank § 204(b), H.R. 4173 § 204(b) (appointing the FDIC as receiver).
223. See id. § 205(a), H.R. 4173 § 205(a) (instructing the FDIC to appoint the
Securities Investor Protection Corporation as a trustee for the liquidation).
224. See id. § 208(a), H.R. 4173 § 208(a) (dismissing any case or proceeding
commenced under the Bankruptcy Code).
225. Id. § 206, H.R. 4173 § 206.
226. See id § 204(d), H.R. 4173 § 204(d) (authorizing the OLA to make loans to the
covered financial company, purchase or guarantee the assets of the covered financial
company, or assume or guarantee the obligations of the covered financial company); id.
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227comes from sums borrowed from the Treasury Department. To repay
Treasury, the OLA establishes a segregated fund in the Treasury (the Orderly
Liquidation Fund, or OLF) supplied by assessments on covered financial
228companies. Commentators debate whether failing bank holding companies
should receive government assistance. 2 One point of dispute is systemic risk.
Systemic risk, although often invoked, is hard to define and arguably regulate
effectively. The failure of financial institutions can produce significant loss in
financial institutions or nonfinancial markets. However, the distinction between
cascading losses resulting from a financial company's failure and large
macroeconomic effects produced by its failure is elusive. Sign~ificantly, the OLA
employs but does not define the operative notion of systemic risk .230 Another
dispute is over the consequences of financial assistance. Assistance may dampen
the effects of financial breakdowns and thus avert major losses to the real
economy. On the other hand, assistance represents a cross-subsidy from
contributing holding companies which do not create systemic risk. The cross-
subsidy makes financial institutions more willing to engage in risky behavior and
may make financial breakdowns more likely.
This Article takes no position on systemic risk or how effectively the OLA
or supervisory authority regulates it.211 It focuses instead on control of the
§ 2 10(a), H.R. 4173 § 2 10(a) (giving the FDIC a wide range of enumerated powers to assist
covered financial companies). in exercising these powers the OLA is instructed to ensure
that the "creditors and shareholders will bear the losses of the financial company." See id.
§ 204(a), H.R. 4173 § 204(a) (discussing the purpose of OLA).
227. See id. § 2 10(n)(5), H.R. 4173 § 2 10(n)(5) (listing the parties that have the
authority to issue obligations).
228. See id. § 210(n)(1), (o)(1)(13), H.R. 4173 § 210(n)(1), (o)(1)(13) (establishing the
OLF and requiring the FDIC to recover risk-based assessments on certain financial
companies when necessary to repay the Treasury).
229. See, e.g., Ken Ayotte & David A. Skeel, Jr., Bankruptcy or Bailouts?, 35 J. CORP.
L. 469, 483-88 (2010) (discussing the issues surrounding government assistance to failing
banks).
230. See Dodd-Frank § 203(b)(2), H.R. 4173 § 203(b)(2) (requiring a determination
that the failure would have "serious adverse effects on the financial stability of the United
States"); see also George G. Kauftnan & Kenneth E. Scott, Wh'7at is Systemic Risk, and Do
Bank Regulators Retard or Contribute to It, 7 INDEP. Rcv. 371, 372-75 (2003) (providing a
description of different notions of systematic risk).
231. We also do not address two subsidiary questions. One is the choice of
governmental agency to provide assistance. The second question concerns how the
assistance is funded. In the recent crisis Treasury provided money to bank holding
companies pursuant to the Troubled Asset Relief Program. See generally U.S. DEP'T OF
TREASURY, TARP CAPITAL PURCHASE PROGRAM, available at http://www.ustreas.gov/press/
releases/reports/document5hpl2O7.pdf. Some of the motivation for the Resolution Act is a
desire to shift the funding of this assistance from general tax revenue to a special fund
administered by the FDIC and raised by assessments on large bank holding companies. This
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resolution process itself. To begin, notice that FDIC-provided financial
assistance does not by itself require or justify FDIC control over a bank holding
company's resolution. Such assistance gives the FDIC a claim against the bank
holding company in its resolution. But this says nothing about whether the FDIC
must or should control the company's resolution process. For example, the
federal government provided substantial loans and other assistance to General
Motors both before and after it filed for bankruptcy and thus had a claim on
General Motors' assets.232 Although the government may have played a major
role in the General Motors bankruptcy, the other claimants were at least entitled
to notice and a hearing before General Motors sold most of its assets.23
Similarly, if the Treasury or Federal Reserve 24provides assistance to a bank
holding company it will have a claim against the company. Under present law,
in the holding company's bankruptcy, the government shares control with all
other claimants against the holding company's estate. It does not completely
control the holding company's resolution. In short, current law adopts a rule of
"claim without total control." Of course, a change in law could give the FDIC or
other government agency total control over the resolution process, even if it had
no claim against the holding company. "Total control without a claim" has a
historical precedent. A predecessor bill to the 1933 Bank Act proposed a federal
agency to dispose of failed banks .23 ' The proposal was based on perceived
inefficiencies in state bank receiverships. Similarly, inefficiencies in the
Bankruptcy Code might justify a government-controlled receivership process for
bank holding companies. Our point is simply that a claim against a holding
company does not by itself require or justify control of the company's resolution.
The residual claimant principle defended in Part 11 does not justify the
FDIC's control of the resolution of bank holding companies. The FDIC could
have a significant claim against the failed bank holding company, either because
it provided direct assistance to the holding cmany236 or if the bank holding
shift may make direct government assistance more politically palatable by blunting populist
anger over the use of general tax revenue to rescue large banks. This shift may also have
desirable tax incidence implications, although we know of no study that has conducted the
necessary analysis.
232. See supra note 53 and accompanying text (detailing the sales of both Chrysler and
GM).
233. Supra note 53 and accompanying text.
234. See 12 U.S.C. § 343 (2006) (providing limited authority for the Federal Reserve Bank
to lend to nonbanks).
235. See supra notes 150-51 and accompanying text (describing the proposed Federal
Liquidating Corporation, which would have had power to completely liquidate a failed bank
regardless of the government's lack of a claim against the bank).
236. The OLA permits the FDIC to fund companies from sums borrowed from the Treasury
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company issued a source-of-strength guarantee in connection with a
previous capital restoration plan.237 However, we doubt that this claim
would often make the FDIC the residual claimant of the systematically
important failed bank holding company. The Resolution Act gives the
FDIC priority over general claims and subordinated debt2 38 just as current
law grants the FDIC priority over the general claims and subordinated
debt of banks. 3 Unlike most banks, however, the largest bank holding
companies have substantial amounts of general claims and subordinated
debt.2 40  Thus, the FDIC would be the residual claimant only if the
Department.
237. See 12 U.S.C. § 1831(e)(2)(E) (providing that FDIC approval of a capital restoration
plan requires the controlling company to guarantee the lesser of 5% of undercapitalized bank's
assets or the amount needed to adequately capitalize bank). The Federal Reserve Board has its
own broader source-of-strength authority. See 12 C.F.R. § 225.4(aX2) (2009) (granting the Board
the power to require a bank holding company to cease any financially risky activity). While
exercise of that authority can give the Board a claim against the parent, it does not give the FDIC
a claim. See id. (granting authority only to the Federal Reserve Board).
238. See Dodd-Frank § 210(b)(1), H.R. 4173 § 210(b)(1) (ordering the priority of
claims); cf Establishing a Framework for Systemic Risk Regulation: Hearing Before the H.
Comm. on Banking, Housing, and Urban Affairs, 11Ith Cong. 7 (2009) (statement of Sheila
C. Bair, Chairman FDIC) ("The new resolution powers should result in the shareholders and
unsecured creditors taking losses prior to the government .. . .").
239. See 12 U.S.C. § 1821(d)(11)(A) (providing the FDIC's position in order of
priority); id. § 1813(1)(5) (defining the term "deposit").
240. Most of the assets of the five largest U.S. bank holding companies are in the form
of stock or debt held in their bank and nonbank subsidiaries, as the following chart shows.
Company: March 31, 2009 Unconsolidated Balance Sheet (Selected Items)
Bank of Wells Goldman
_______J.P. Mforgan Ctrop America Fago Sachs
Total Assets 444.5 361.5 446.8 257.5 293
Stock in Subs 184.2(41.4%) 192.6(532%) 241.3 (54%) 33.1( 2 )
Loans to Subs 148.6(33.4%) 134.1 (37%) 53.2 (11.9%) 78.2 (30.3%) 177.5 (60.5%)
Lial 274.3 217.5 207.3 157.2 229.1Liabilities
Short Term Debt
Commercial 128.5 (10.3%) 0(0%) 9.1 (4.3%) 5.3 (3.3%) 34.6 (15.1%V)
Paper
Other 25.3 (9.2%) 10.2 (4.6% 13.0 (6.2%) 22.3 (14.1%) 155.3 (67.7%)
Long Term Debt
Subordinated 27.6 (10%) 26.5 (12.1%) 29.5 (14.2%) 13.4(8.5%) 5.3(2.3%)
Debt
Other Debt 144.5 (52.6%e) 127.6 (58.6%) 114.3 (55.1IL) 79.5 (50.5%Z) 17.6(7.6%)
Other
Liabilities 6.1 (2.2%) 7.7(3.5%) 7.9 (3.8%) 5.6 (3.5%) 16.1 (7%)
Amounts in Billions (rounded). Source: http://www.ffec.gov/nicpubweb/nicweb
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value of the bank holding company's assets fell by an amount sufficient to
extinguish this debt. This is unlikely. At a minimum, ongoing regulatory
supervision of bank holding companies are likely to make such significant
declines in assets values infrequent in the range of cases. In fact, the FDIC is
also unlikely to be the residual claimant when the very largest banks fail.
These mega-banks are the subsidiaries of the systematically important bank
holding companies. As a result, the residual claimant principle suggests that
the FDIC should have less control over the failure of large banks and their
parent corporations, not more.24
Supporters of the OLA might argue that the FDIC's relative lack of a
financial interest makes it an impartial agent, much like a bankruptcy trustee
in Chapter 7 or a state receiver.24 A crucial difference, however, is that
bankcruptcy and state receivership law subjects the trustee or receiver' s
control to judicial oversight and grants interested parties the right to be heard.
The FDIC is not subject to similar oversight. 4 Judicial scrutiny helps
mitigate the risk that the agent will slacken her efforts or serve her own
interest. On the other hand, this oversight delays resolution and may increase
administrative costs. It is at least theoretically possible that the benefits
provided by speed would outweigh the costs of a loss ofjudicial oversight.
In Section III we rejected speed and secrecy as a justification for the
FDIC's control of bank resolutions, and we are skeptical about its use to
justifyr FDIC control of very large bank holding companies or other financial
concerns. The first reason we rejected speed and secrecy in the bank context
does not apply to bank holding companies. Bank resolutions promptly
reimburse insured depositors; they do not promptly dispose of the failed
bank's assets. Bank holding companies and nonbank financial companies do
not take in deposits. However, they do have short-term obligations that may
make them vulnerable if their counter-parties get nervous and try to quickly
241. This is subject to the same caveats that we expressed above. For example, the
assignment of control to the FDIC might still be efficient even if it is not the residual
claimant if this gives subordinated claims an incentive to ensure that the firm does not
become insolvent and the FDIC does not seize control.
242. This assumes that the FDIC has no stake in the failed firm or that there is sufficient
debt junior to the FDIC to insulate the FDIC from loss.
243. See supra note 100 and accompanying text (noting that claimants against failed
banks do not, under current law, have recourse to voting procedures or judicial interference
in disposition of the bank's assets); cf Dodd-Frank § 202(a)(l)(A)(iii), H.R. 4173
§ 202(a)(1)(A)(iii) (stating that review of the Treasury Secretary's determination of
company actual or immanent default is subject to the "arbitrary and capricious" standard); id.
§ 2 10(c), H.R. 4173 § 2 10(c) (stating that court action which limits the FDIC's exercise of
power if permitted to the extent that it is provided in the OLA).
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withdraw their funds. A prompt resolution could perhaps ease counter-party
fears if it could somehow solve the liquidity crisis by quickly disposing of the
assets and reimbursing creditors.
The FDIC's experience in quickly resolving failed banks is not
encouraging. It gives no reason to believe that the FDIC would resolve a
bank holding company much more quickly than would bankruptcy, unless the
FDIC were willing to provide substantial assistance that shifts much of the
risk of loss to the FDIC itself.2 "4 Recall that in most bank failures the FDIC
retains at least 75% of the failed bank's assets after the initial assignment and
assumption 45 and liquidates them over a period of about four years.24 By
contrast, bankruptcy courts required a little less than one and a half years, on
average, to dispose of the filings of large publicly traded corporations
between 1995 and 2008.24 It is reasonable to expect an even slower pace in
disposing of assets at the holding company level that affiliate banks do not
typically maintain. Granted, the FDIC sometimes sells all or substantially all
of the assets of the failed bank immediately upon seizing the failed bank.
These resolutions are marginally quicker than the fastest bankruptcies
resolved by use of Section 363. However, in conducting these immediate
sales the FDIC usually agrees to bear much of the risk of a fall in the value of
these assets through a loss-sharing agreement. 4 It is the FDIC's willingness
244. Sheila Bair, the chairman of the FDIC, might disagree with this assessment. In a
recent editorial she argued in favor of the proposed reforms because the FDIC has a proven
record of resolving failed banks without disrupting credit services. See Sheila Bair,
Editorial, Beyond Bankruptcy and Bailouts, WALL ST. J., Apr. 5, 20 10, at A 19 (arguing that
the FDIC's record supports the proposed reforms). We argue that this ability to maintain
liquidity for depositors depends on the FDIC's deposit insurance and not its expertise in
resolving failed financial institutions. Others are more skeptical of the value of the FDIC's
experience, noting that the banks resolved by the FDIC are much smaller and have
qualitatively different assets and liabilities than the systematically important institutions that
are the subject of the bill. See, e.g., Peter J. Wallison & David Skeel, Editorial, The Dodd
Bill. Bailouts Forever, WALL ST. J., Apr. 7, 2010, at A15 (arguing against the proposed bill
based on the nature of the systematically important institutions it targets).
245. See supra note 81 and accompanying text (noting that in 5 1% of reported cases,
less than 25% of the failed bank's assets were purchased back).
246. See supra note 13 and accompanying text (providing an average timeline for
liquidation of the failed bank's assets).
247. We used Lynn LoPucki's Bankruptcy Research Database to calculate this figure.
See Lynn M LoPucki 's Bankruptcy Research Database, http://lopucki.law.ucla.edu/
bankruptcy research.asp (last visited Sept. 28, 2010) (providing a database of bankruptcy
cases for research) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review).
248. See supra notes 81-82 and accompanying text (noting that when the FDIC was
able to sell the majority of the assets of the failed bank, it usually entered into a loss-sharing
agreement with the buyer, retaining much of the risk of a decline in value).
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to retain troubled assets or assume the risk of a decline in their value that
provides liquidity and prevents the assets from being sold at "fire sale" prices.
In a bank failure the FDIC's willingness to assume this risk is
unobjectionable; the FDIC already accepts this risk when it insures the major
liability of the bank-the domestic deposits. The FDIC has not, however,
guaranteed the short-term obligations of bank holding companies. Although
bank failures cannot be directly compared to bankruptcy filings, the burden of
proof is on the proponents of change in the resolution of bank holding
companies.
V1. Conclusion
It is not obvious why the FDIC should have the central role it has in
resolving failed banks. The bankruptcy law of most other countries does not
give bank regulators this role. Two arguments sometimes are given to justify
the FDIC's control over the bank resolution process: speed in asset disposal
and the FDIC's status as the largest creditor of the failed bank. The argument
from speed wrongly conflates the quickness with which assets are disposed
with the quickness with which deposits can convert their deposits into cash.
Speed in disposing of assets has nothing to do with preserving the liquidity of
deposits. This Article, however, takes seriously the FDIC's status as the
largest creditor of the typical failed bank and the implications of this status.
Data suggest that the likely asset values of most failed banks makes the FDIC
the residual claimant on those assets. It therefore has the proper incentives to
act to maximize these asset values. Other stakeholders in those assets do not
have the same incentives. This is distinctive of most bank insolvencies, and
justifies giving the FDIC control of the resolution process. Things could be
different and sometimes are. The capital structures of mega-banks often
differ from those of the typical failed bank. Bank holding companies too
exhibit more complicated capital structures, with significant general and
subordinated debt. With large banks, the allocation of control to the FDIC is
presumptively unjustified. Nonregulatory claimants likely are the residual
claimants on the assets of bank holding companies. In both cases the residual
claimant principle demands that these claimants be given a voice. The
FDIC's control over the resolution of these entities must be justified on other
grounds.
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